JPRS 78532

16 July 1981

Latin America Report

No. 2341

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 78532

16 July 1981

LATIN AMERICA REPORT

No. 2341

CONTENTS

ENERGY ECONOMICS

MEXICO

Moctezuma Cid Takes Over at PEMEX
(Carlos A. Medina; EXCELSIOR, 7 Jun 81)..... 1

Crude To Diversify Buyers Is Limited
(Arturo de Aquino; EL SOL DE MEXICO, 8 Jun 81)..... 3

Diaz Serrano: Refining Deal With Romania Pending
(Diaz Serrano Interview; EL DIA, 2 Jun 81)..... 5

Briefs
Oil Deal With Costa Rica 10

COUNTRY SECTION

BRAZIL

Brizola Says 1982 Elections 'Fundamental,' Whoever Wins
(Alexandre Garcia; MANCHETE, 27 Jun 81)..... 11

CHILE

Briefs
CNI Torture Charges 20
Abandoned Guerrilla Camp 20
Union Leaders Sentenced 21
Unity With Argentina 21

CUBA

Reportage on Fidel Castro's Tour of Eastern Provinces
(Antonio Nunez Jimenez; CUBA INTERNACIONAL, May 81)..... 22

NICARAGUA

National Forum Continues Discussion of Problems
(Radio Sandino, 5 Jul 81)..... 35

'MUNDO OBRERO' Interviews Interior Minister Borge
(Tomas Borge Interview; MUNDO OBRERO, 26 Jun-2 Jul 81)..... 47

VENEZUELA

MAS Leader Comments on Purchase of F-16's
(Jose Vicente Rangel Interview; Radio Continente Network,
6 Jul 81)..... 54

MOCTEZUMA CID TAKES OVER AT PEMEX

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 7 Jun 81 pp 1-A, 15-A

[Article by Carlos A. Medina: "I Do Not Want To Cause Any Discord"]

[Text] Technical Office did not approve "my decision" to cut crude prices. I did my best to serve my country and its government--he said to JLP [Jose Lopez Portillo]. Oteyza officially disclosed the change in the board of directors. JRMC [Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid] reported that the petroleum industry program would not be interrupted.

Jorge Diaz Serrano last night resigned from the office of general manager of Mexican Petroleum "because my decision to cut crude prices was not unanimously approved by the economic office"; in his letter to the president of the republic he furthermore pointed out the following: "Not wishing to become the cause of discord, I prefer to submit my irrevocable resignation to you." Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid was appointed in his place.

The PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum] board of directors met behind closed door, without letting the press in, and it was up to Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Development Jose Andres Oteyza, in his capacity as chairman of that body, officially to announce the resignation of Diaz Serrano and the presidential appointment of Moctezuma Cid.

The letter of resignation from Diaz Serrano concluded as follows: "I sincerely express to you my gratitude for having permitted me to serve my country and its government which at all times I did with my best effort and my utmost faith in the destiny of Mexico. I also want to thank you personally for the kind way in which you have treated me."

At the board meeting, the secretary of patrimony and industrial development said, according to a tape recording supplied to the information media, that Diaz Serrano served faithfully and worked hard for the country and "that both the government and Mexican Petroleum owe him much of their tremendous development."

Oteyza also said that almost 5 years ago, when he became PEMEX manager, production was 900,000 barrels of crude and that, as he leaves the organization, it is 2.5 million barrels every 24 hours and that all of this is the result "of a titanic labor, of professional capacity and brilliant execution by engineer Diaz Serrano" --both in the development of current exploitation programs and in exploring hydrocarbon reserves.

According to the tape recording, Diaz Serrano displayed "a great vocation for service both to the institution and to the government" and this speaker emphasized that "Diaz Serrano is a great personal friend of all of us who are gathered at this board meeting here today."

Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid, the new general manager of PEMEX, is the former general manager of the IEPES [Institute of Political, Economic, and Social Studies] of the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party], a former secretary of finance and public credit, and until last night the coordinator of administrative planning in the office of the president of the republic; he expressed his appreciation for his appointment by the chief executive and said that "I got the news just a few minutes ago" and "the activity plans of this industry will not be interrupted." He did not give any further details.

The leader of the petroleum workers, Salvador Barragan Camacho, greatly praised the work done by engineer Diaz Serrano: "He is a great friend of ours, he is a great Mexican" and he added "He managed to win the respect of all workers; he was a great collaborator of the president of the republic. He has left an indelible imprint. He was faithful to the president and Mexico"--as it said on the tape recording.

According to PEMEX press officers, the emergency board meeting was attended by secretary of planning and budget Miguel de la Madrid; Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Development Jose Andres Oteyza; Secretary of Finance and Public Credit David Ibarra Munoz; general manager of the Federal Electric Power Commission Alberto Escofet; general manager of the National Finance Company Jorge Espinosa de los Reyes; and secretary-general of the Petroleum Worker Union of the Mexican Republic Salvador Barragan Camacho, among others.

"Very Important Report"

Around 1600, PEMEX press and media employees urgently called all of the media to get them to listen at 1930 "because there is going to be a very important report." They did not give any details and after 2 hours during which newsmen had been on pins and needles, news of Diaz Serrano's resignation began to filter out.

Newsmen were not allowed to interview either Diaz Serrano or Moctezuma Cid; they were only allowed to go to the antechamber of the organization's office of the general manager to receive an unsigned news release sheet, giving neither the heading, nor the date of the resignation.

Here is the text of the resignation:

"By virtue of the fact that my decision to reduce the price of crude was not unanimously approved by the economic office and not wishing to become a cause of discord, I prefer to submit to you my irrevocable resignation from the office of general manager of Mexican Petroleum with which you have honored me.

"I sincerely express to you my gratitude for having allowed me to serve my country and your administration which I have at all times done to the very best of my ability and with the utmost faith in the destiny of Mexico. I also want to thank you personally for the kind way you have treated me."

CRUDE TO DIVERSIFY BUYERS IS LIMITED

Mexico City EL SOL DE MEXICO in Spanish 8 Jun 81 pp 1-A, 15-A

[Article by Arturo de Aquino: "Mexico Has 24,000 Barrels of Crude To Diversify Its List of Customers--Will Have To Increase Output If It Wants New Customers"]

[Text] Mexico only has two alternatives for diversifying its list of petroleum buyers: increase the petroleum production level or some customers might cancel their purchasing contracts--because anything else would be impossible.

According to reports from Mexican Petroleum and the National Energy Plan, Mexico only has 24,000 barrels of crude within its production limits and for export in seeking new customers and in coming up with a new way of handling sales commitments abroad.

As we know, the Mexican hydrocarbons production ceiling is 2.75 million barrels per day with 1.5 million barrels available for export.

Right now, official statistics from Mexican Petroleum indicate that export commitments already come to 1,476,000 barrels per day, which leaves only 24,000 barrels for finding new customers for Mexican crude.

According to that report from PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum], there are 19 countries to which we currently export 1,476,000 barrels every 24 hours.

The United States heads the list of buyers with more than 50 percent of the total or 750,000 barrels of petroleum per day, followed by Spain with 190,000 and France and Japan with 100,000 barrels per day, each.

To Israel and Brazil, we ship approximately 60,000 barrels per day, while Canada and Sweden get 50,000 barrels per day, each, followed next in importance by India which gets 30,000 barrels during that same span of time.

The list of Mexican petroleum customers continues, in order of importance, with the Dominican Republic with 14,000 barrels, Panama with 12,000 barrels, the Philippines and Yugoslavia with 10,000 barrels per day, each, and Guatemala with 8,500 barrels.

Finally, we have the following on our list: Nicaragua and Costa Rica with 7,500 barrels per day, each, Honduras with 6,000 barrels, and the list terminates with Haiti to which we ship 3,500 barrels of fuel per day.

On the basis of these figures supplied by the petroleum company, the desire to clean up the list of purchasers is subject to what we can do with 24,000 barrels of crude per day or to some of the customers deciding to cancel purchasing commitments signed with Mexico.

The information supplied by the semigovernment petroleum outfit furthermore indicates that, by the end of 1981, we will reach the output ceiling of 2.75 million barrels of crude per day and then we will have 1.5 million barrels available for sale abroad.

5058
CSO: 3010/1479

DIAZ SERRANO: REFINING DEAL WITH ROMANIA PENDING

Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 2 Jun 81 p 6

[Interview with Mexican Petroleum Manager Diaz Serrano: "Mexican Petroleum Refining in Romania Being Negotiated--Price Fluctuation Is Situation We Must Learn To Live With"]

[Text] Here is the complete text of the interview granted to the press yesterday by the PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum] general manager on board the military transport Chihuahua.

[Question] Some of the information media have indicated in recent days that the United States is applying political pressure on Mexico to get Mexico to cut the crude barrel price. What can you tell us on that score?

[Answer] The price of each barrel of crude depended fundamentally on the output of Saudi Arabia. It was hoped that, during the latest gathering in Geneva, last week, Saudi Arabia would agree to cut its output back because the supply, worldwide, is excessive and there is even heavy stockpiling and reserves ashore, as they are called, were causing pressure to be put on the price and it was hoped that Saudi Arabia would go ahead and cut its output back. The first day after the end of the meeting it was announced furthermore that all OPEC members would cut their output back 10 percent which would reduce the output by 2.5 million barrels per day; that could have made it possible to reduce reserves on land, that is to say, stockpiling.

That is what was announced but in the afternoon of that same day it was noted that only one group in the OPEC would cut its output back and that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran would not reduce their output. Next, it was said that there would be a reduction of 1.1 million or some such thing.

This has been causing a situation bringing about a decline in petroleum worldwide and what we have to do is to show that we are more competitive. Now, if one deduces from this that pressure from the United States is behind all that, then that is a matter of imagination.

[Question] How could Mexico accept that sort of thing?

[Answer] The most probable thing is that, to be competitive, we are going to have to cut the price of our barrel to such a level that we will manage to hold on to our customers and so that we might even have to look for new ones. That was the reason for my trip to Europe recently.

[Question] But the Mexican economy would get to feel the effects of that measure very seriously, would it not?

[Answer] It certainly would get to feel it since, to the extent that the price goes down, our income goes down.

[Question] Sir, in other words, Mexico's production ceiling will be as indicated, as projected--will it not?

[Answer] That is correct; it will be as indicated in the Energy Plan. We are going to export 1.5 million barrels per day. But in point of fact we have not yet reached that mark. We might get up to 1.4 million this month, possibly, and by the end of the year we would have a program of 1.5 million barrels per day in crude exports and the total output possibly might be around 2.75 million, which is what it says in the energy program.

[Question] Sir, our petroleum sales are under contract which means that, right now, the established price will go down. Is that so?

[Answer] We are operating the way everybody operates in the petroleum world: with a contract which is called "always open" and in which we revise the prices quarterly; but the parties involved reserve themselves the right to request a revision if the market so requires. That is what is happening now.

[Question] Both up and down, right?

[Answer] Both up and down. We raise prices on the average during one quarter and it is probable that now, in June, before the quarter is over, they will ask us to reduce them.

[Question] Are prices going to be frozen, Sir?

[Answer] The price freeze is a result of the fact that Saudi Arabia did not take any action on prices. They charge the lowest price anywhere on the market; they sell at $32.00 crude indicator. Our crude indicator is $38.50. So, we hope that prices will go up at least to $34.00. The crude indicator price of the OPEC is $36.00. But so far, as we have found out, they have refused to raise their price.

So, the situation is very uncertain right now because we do not know whether they are going to implement the reductions which they decided on and whether they are going to have a real price freeze or whether they can vary it as they wish; each country can do that.

[Question] According to the latest agreement signed this week in Geneva, it seems that they agreed to maintain the same price until December. In other words, Mexico has always declared itself in favor of going along with the OPEC prices. Are we going to continue that policy without discussion?

[Answer] We are watching market prices; we are against the market, we have no relations with OPEC. The market in the Gulf of Mexico is suffering a decline. This means that prices go down; they are indeed declining.

[Question] What are the plans for the rest of the 6-year term?

[Answer] We have our Overall Development Plan and our activities are spelled out in it. We submitted our plan at the start of the 6-year term and we will continue to work normally.

Look here: In all activities, in all raw material production efforts, in the case of all manufactured products, there are cycles during which prices fluctuate. This is a temporary fluctuation. My opinion is that the price of petroleum will be sustained in long-range terms. It is possible that it might continue rather fluid this year; but this is fundamentally due to the fact that the developed countries have managed considerably to reduce their consumption. Over the past 18 months, consumption in countries such as the United States, Japan, and France, went down 9 percent and those countries reduced worldwide consumption by 4.5 million barrels per day. This means that there is less of a demand, while we keep reducing the same quantity, so that there is a heavy accumulation and we have less requests for crude.

We are going through an interval which in my opinion is temporary and which features a reduction on the market; but this is going to level off; the petroleum market will tend to go up in a manner different from the way it did starting in 1973; this is desirable because all savings must be made within an efficient plan.

I thus look upon the situation with calm. We must find ways to recover the foreign exchange which we are not going to get because of the price decline. We have alternatives and we are going to follow them up.

[Question] Up to what point are we going to cut back?

[Answer] We do not know as yet. We are negotiating with the various customers at this moment.

[question] Sir, Changing the topic slightly: Isolated bits of information have arrived from your trip, for example, to the effect that PEMEX will establish a company in the United States to open a chain of gas stations.

[Answer] This is one of the possibilities we were talking about up to a certain moment. We have for quite some time been thinking along these lines and we have been conducting studies regarding refining operations abroad and selling on other markets Mexican refined products along with Mexican crude and during my trip I went to the GDR in this connection. We are entertaining very serious talks with them and we even signed a letter of intention with the Romanians.

This is a question of complex refineries. Simple refineries are not good because the products that come out are mostly heavy products, that is to say, more fuel oil and not so much gasoline.

The Romanians have complex refineries and we are therefore trying to refine our crude there and through the sales machinery which they have and which is quite big in that part of the world so that we will be able to sell--if we arrive at an agreement--Mexican products in that entire area and around Romania, in the Mediterranean, in the western part of Europe.

[Question] Would this be something similar to PETRONOR?

[Answer] This is another type of association because we are not going to make any investments there; we would pay so and so much per barrel; they would charge us for storage, refining, handling, and distribution. We would have people watching the process and they would at the same time learn sales procedures in all of these regions and that would give us a very wide opening to be able to compensate ourselves for whatever we do not sell in the form of crude because in the long run our policy is not to export crude but rather to export refined products, either in Mexico or on markets such as the one in Romania.

This was one of the most important things during my trip to Europe, that is, having talked with sufficient pragmatism to the Romanians so as to get this project going. They want it and we want it too.

[Question] Were there any plans involving Italy likewise, in other words, were there any negotiations with ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency]?

[Answer] We talked to ENI in Italy but we were unable as yet to get anywhere due to the lack of complex refineries. They do have very basic refineries which put out much fuel oil. They are interested in fuel oil because they generate electric energy with fuel oil; but they are going to have to change because, since they are getting much natural gas from Russia, from the Soviet Union, they are using that to replace fuel oil. And refineries of this type are obsolete and besides they are going to have to make them more complicated.

Just to make sure that you understand what I mean: A refinery is like a pot in which you boil a liquid and where you get light products which were in the liquid. And that is all that you can get out of it. You get 50 percent gasoline and you get 50 percent heavy products, in other words, fuel oil; but if you attach a vacuum pump to that, then you get more gasoline and if you then add fire to that and steam and if you break up the molecules, you get even more gasoline and in the end you are left with nothing more than 20 or 30 percent heavy products in the form of fuel oil and the rest is gasoline for which you can charge a higher price. So, the economic aspect of that installation is favorable and this is what we are after. In Italy they do not yet have this type of facility.

However, we are talking to all potential customers. We have had expressions of interest from countries such as Korea or Brazil which still wants to talk to us about that; the latest visit by the governor of Sao Paulo opened the doors to further conversations. Great Britain wants our heavy petroleum.

This is the moment at which a seller's market becomes a buyer's market. So, those who hold the strong cards are those who are purchasing and a hidden struggle among the markets becomes an open struggle. There is stiff competition and few countries have the capacity, as does Mexico, to forge ahead in a competitive struggle because we have a big domestic market, we have alternatives involving gas, refined products, petrochemical products, and we have lots of know how to carry out all of these operations.

In my opinion, this is a situation we are going to have to learn to live with. We emerged as exporters at a moment when those who were exporting were running the

show. Now the situation has changed, we are dealing a new deck, and we have to live on this other side of the market in order, hopefully, to get back to a less contorted more rational market, which is what President Lopez Portillo is really after. This is what he wants through his Worldwide Energy Plan.

[Question] So, we could say definitely that the drop on the international market will not affect us because we have other alternatives.

[Answer] That is a very dangerous thing to do because if you say that this does not affect us, you are wrong because everything that happens does affect us. What we have to do is take steps to make sure that these effects will be neutralized through other types of action.

In other words, I do not want anybody to put words into my mouth because it is very wrong to say that "this will not affect us." It is affecting us and we have to cope with it.

[Question] Getting back to the United States, are we shipping finished products and gasoline to the United States? Are we going to have gasoline stations there?

[Answer] This would be a good possibility because that is the world's biggest market. But the problem is complex here because, apart from the fact that they have all types of refineries--they have very basic ones, going all the way to the most complex ones--there is the taxation aspect, which is very tough, and so we are going to have to investigate this carefully. We are already working with several companies, not just one. We have 70 companies that have expressed their interest to us and the practical implementation aspect will depend on the studies that will be made and the steps to be taken by President Lopez Portillo.

[Question] So we will see the day when PEMEX will show up in all towns in the United States.

[Answer] Of course. There is no reason why it should not.

5058
CSO: 3010/1479

BRIEFS

OIL DEAL WITH COSTA RICA--Mexico and Costa Rica yesterday signed a loan agreement implementing the financial cooperation spelled out in the energy cooperation program for Central American countries and the Caribbean which was signed on 30 August by the presidents of Mexico and Venezuela in the city of San Jose, Costa Rica. The ceremony took place in the board room of the Bank of Mexico with its general manager Gustavo Romero Kolbeck signing for the latter while energy and mining minister Fernando Altmann signed for the Central Bank of Costa Rica. As we recall, the previously mentioned San Jose program was drawn up within a context of solidarity among the developing countries, allocating as much as 160,000 barrels of crude petroleum to take care of the net domestic petroleum consumption requirements from amounts imported by the countries that are the beneficiaries of the above-mentioned program, even though it specifies further that Mexico and Venezuela will grant credit for 30 percent of the petroleum sales at low interest rates and for terms of 5 years. As part of the agreement drawn up with Costa Rica, Mexican Petroleum will supply that country with 7,500 barrels per day, or 50 percent of its domestic consumption, through the pipeline owned by the Costa Rican refining company, Petroleo S.A. [Text] [Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 2 Jun 81 p 9] 5058

CSO: 3010/1479

BRIZOLA SAYS 1982 ELECTIONS 'FUNDAMENTAL,' WHOEVER WINS

Rio de Janeiro MANCHETE in Portuguese 27 Jun 81 pp 38-40, 42, 45

[Report on interview with Leonel de Moura Brizola, secretary of the Democratic Labor Party, in Rio de Janeiro by Alexandre Garcia: "Brizola: Confesions on a Rainy Afternoon"; date not given]

[Text] During an entire afternoon in his office in the Democratic Labor Party [PDT] secretariat up in Santa Tereza, in Rio, Leonel Brizola gave this exclusive interview to MANCHETE. While he was recalling his impetuous actions at the age of 30 to 40, the wind whistled through the window, the rain ran down the windowpane and thunder reverberated on the hillside.

The report went on into the evening, warmed by a gourd of mate. The weather had already abated when Leonel Brizola, 59, began to speak about his apprenticeship in exile, in Europe and in the United States, and construction of the PDT in Brazil. His testimony filled 40 pages and his concern about the future of Brazilian democracy gave him no rest. Three days later, still concerned, he telephoned Brasilia, asking me to add the following:

"The fundamental thing is that the 1982 elections be held, freely and honestly, not who wins them--that is our view of democracy. Even a PDS [Social Democratic Party] government, if elected by popular vote, will have a highly democratic significance."

Brizola also asked me not to stir up old wounds. "My view of current times in Brazil is one of equilibrium. No one will persuade me to be radical. We are seeking to construct a democracy, with a pluralistic view of social democracy."

And he ended the telephone conversation with a justification: "I admit my excesses, but the situation in which they were committed was desperate. Yes, I made mistakes, but a whole ruling class committed the grave error of going against the constitution."

Leonel de Moura Brizola was born on the eve of the 1923 Revolution in Rio Grande do Sul on a ranch at the forest's edge called Paragem de Sao Bento, now the

municipality of Carazinho. His father, Jose, became a captain in the insurgent forces of Leonel Rocha and, in tribute to his chief, gave the name to his son. After the Pedras Altas peace was signed, Jose was returning home, already demobilized. Dona Oniva, carrying 1-year-old Leonel in her arms and surrounded by her five other children, went to meet her husband along a dusty footpath. They all heard the shots. Jose was dead, ambushed by government forces.

"It was pure vengeance. The peace was already signed. But my mother brought us up teaching that vengeance only leads to retaliation." When he became governor, Brizola learned that Vitor Doumoncel, who ordered the crime to be committed, was still alive. "I could have had revenge, but I did nothing. My mother's teachings helped me understand what amnesty is: a pardon by both sides. The old lady was right. If I were bent on revenge, I would not be able to rebuild my life."

The young boy was brought up by a Protestant minister in Carazinho, from which he was sent by the municipal government to the Viamao Agricultural School at the age of 12, with 25 milreis in his pocket. He arrived in Porto Alegre and found the school's gates locked. "Now that I'm here, I'll just have to put up with it. If I go back, I'll be disgraced." So he shined shoes, was a scale changer and an elevator operator. He kept trying to get into the school and had the highest score on the entrance examination. When he was about to enter, he found he did not even have a birth certificate.

He went to the Viamao Agricultural School for 3 years and then to Porto Alegre, where he attended middle school at the Julio de Castilhos State Academy. At 17 he was employed in a vegetable-oil refinery owned by Ildo Meneghetti. He managed to get a job as a city gardener and lived in the gardening pavilion of Farroupilha Park, where he stayed until his first years at engineering school.

"I always liked politics. When World War II began I went to the British Consulate to enlist." With redemocratization, he went into student politics. "On the one side there was the UDN [National Democratic Union] and the Liberation Party, with Brossard's lace-cuff politics. On the other, the very powerful Communist Party. We had nothing to do with either side, because we were workers and they--Marxists and bourgeoisie--were an intellectual elite. What mattered to us was reality, not theory, and we advocated social legislation. That is how the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party] youth movement was founded."

Brizola was elected a constituent state deputy in 1946, with the student vote. Reelected, he became leader of the PTB in the Assembly in 1950. The following year he was defeated for mayor of Porto Alegre by his former boss, Ildo Meneghetti. In 1952, at the age of 30, he was appointed secretary of public works by Governor Ernesto Dornelles.

On 24 August he picked him up returning from a trip to Santa Maria, with Wilson Vargas and Sereno Chaise. On the way to the airport in downtown Porto Alegre, Brizola's car was passed by that of Nestor Jost and Hermes Pereira de Souza. "Thinking I had been challenged by their sarcastic smiles, I collided with them and there was an exchange of gunfire. Hermes was wounded in the leg. We later became friends."

Why It Was Necessary to Support Jango As Janio's Successor

Elected a federal deputy in 1954, Brizola spent little time at Tiradentes Palace. He returned to the South, elected mayor of Porto Alegre. Three years later, at age 36, he was elected governor. One day he was approached by a factory worker:

"Excuse me, but didn't you used to work in the vegetable-oil refinery?"

The governor confirmed that he had, recognizing his former co-worker.

"But, Leonel, why have you stopped here?" exclaimed the factory worker in a disapproving tone.

"About my performance as governor, I prefer they listen to my opponents. I think I did a good job. I got along well with President Janio Quadros." When he received news of Janio's resignation, Brizola called Cumbicas. "When I received confirmation of the resignation, through journalist Carlos Castello Branco, I took the logical position of supporting constitutional succession. For us it was a question of honor, because Jango was the chairman of our party and, in my case, also my brother-in-law and friend."

Not knowing the position of the 3d Army and having learned about the military veto of Jango's succession, Brizola put the state Military Brigade in Piratini Palace.

[Question] Was it a suicide decision or just a maneuver?

[Answer] We did not think much about it, at that time; nor about what might happen. We thought that any other position would be a discredit to all of us.

It was the boy from Carazinho who, arriving in Porto Alegre with nothing, refused to turn back.

He tried to organize resistance; he telephoned the governors. "They were trying to temporize." He called up General Costa e Silva, commandant of the 4th Army, sending an appeal "to a son of Rio Grande."

He Had to Speak, So He Requisitioned a Radio Station

"Make the appeal to your Military Brigade. And do me the favor of never calling here again," Costa e Silva had concluded. Brizola reacted "with a few well-chosen remarks. I think that is what started the whole enmity which had its effects later." Upon learning about the order to silence the state government, he managed to get a communication channel, requisitioning Radio Guaiba. His justice secretary, Francisco Brochado da Rocha, argued that radio broadcasting was under federal jurisdiction.

"Don't worry, just make up some kind of legal instrument. While they're arguing about it in court, we will be using the radio. They weren't going to carry out a coup all that easily by telephone."

When General Machado Lopes requested an appointment, Brizola imagined it would be to bring an ultimatum and he was prepared to reply as follows: "There's the phone

over there, general. You may give the order. But you will stay here with us. We are going to confine everyone here." However, the general had come to express the favorable position of the 3d Army and Jango eventually returned. "When Jango arrived in Montevideo he was already deeply involved in agreements about adopting parliamentarism." Tancredo Neves came from Brasilia in the presidential plane, carrying the parliamentarist proposal for Jango in Montevideo. The plane was to stop over in Porto Alegre. "So we drew up a plan to detain the presidental plane and arrest Tancredo, because we disagreed with the agreements. But the plane overflew Porto Alegre and went on to Uruguay. To this day I have not asked Senator Tancredo why he did not land in Porto Alegre on that occasion."

(According to Senator Tancredo, the intention really was to make a stopover at Porto Alegre: "I telegraphed Gen Ernesto Geisel saying that if I landed in Porto Alegre I might try to remove Brizola. General Geisel, in reply, telegraphed informing me that Brizola was preparing to arrest me and detain the plane in Porto Alegre. That is why we canceled the stopover.")

Jango returned from Uruguay and made a stopover in Porto Alegre. Brizola gave him a sheet of paper with a proposal written on it. "Our proposal was to rise up, go to the capital with a military escort, close Congress and at the same time call a constituent assembly within 60 days because Congress had violated the constitution." The proposal was not accepted by the president. "It is possible that this was the root of the differences we had in the future." From the episode, there remains one complaint about General Machado Lopes: "He published a book in which he tries to praise his own position, as if he were a kind of Caxias. I understand that. What I don't understand is that he has so disparaged my own position. I think he played a balancing role and I do not say of him what he unjustly said of me, that I was a kind of Fidel Castro. He was unfair to Gen Amaury Kruel, saying that the general was at the airport with suitcase in hand, dressed in civilian clothes and later appeared as chief of Jango's military household. None of that is true. I sent someone to pick up General Kruel in Rio. He stayed several days in Piratini Palace because it was his privilege as a military commander."

Brizola then began a campaign against parliamentarism and for a plebiscite. "Parliamentarism is a regime that, to function, must be adopted with all its mechanisms. I contend the president must have the right to dissolve Congress and operate the system when the president is elected indirectly by Congress, because this is the only way he has the respect of parliament."

[Question] According to a statement by Paulo Schilling (father of Flavia), your former adviser, there was a "frustrated leftist coup attempt by Brizola" at that time. Is this true?

[Answer] Paulo Schilling thinks he knows what he is talking about, but he does not. The reports of Paulo Schilling are, all of them, very partial because he became very resentful over the course of time. I tell you very frankly, I don't think these reports by Paulo Schilling are worth much. He is uninformed about the essential facts.

According to Brizola, what happened was that Francisco Brochado da Rocha, before becoming prime minister, "made an agreement with me, according to which his mission,

as head of the cabinet, was to arrange a plebiscite." It was also arranged with 3d Army commandant Gen Jair Dantas Ribeiro that he would send a note to 1st Army commandant Gen Osvino Ferreira Alves, expressing the people's displeasure with the situation. "We planned a nighttime meeting--the prime minister, the 3d Army commandant and I, for each to give his own suggestions for the text. When we began the meeting, General Jair took his proposal from the pocket of his tunic and read it. I, who had written another proposal, did not even show it, because the general's was so good." That was followed by the crisis that led to the plebiscite in which Jango recovered presidential powers.

Even then the crisis did not end. "There was no firm leadership, because the government was really a mixture of forces--conservatives, liberals, progressives."

[Question] Was Brizola a poor adviser to Jango at the downtown rally and the meeting with the sergeants in the Automobile Club?

[Answer] I had nothing to do with organizing the 13 March rally. I even had difficulty in speaking, because the rally was organized by sectors closer to the government, such as the Workers Federation. As for the president's speech to the sergeants, I had no participation or even knowledge. I learned about it over the radio.

According to Brizola, there would have been no 31 March 1964 if Jango had appointed Lott minister of war. On that day Brizola was in Porto Alegre, trying to organize the resistance. When Jango arrived there, he was already on the way to Uruguay. But Brizola proposed "that the president withdraw to Sao Borja, protected by a division, and that he appoint General Ladario Telles (3d Army commandant) minister of war and I asked him to appoint me minister of justice, so we could both promote defense of the constitutional order." But Jango did not want to shed any blood. "And I believe he was right, although I did not think so at the time." Forty days later Brizola fled to Uruguay, in the uniform of a Military Brigade soldier.

"In exile, there were some years of conspiracy, of noncompliance, of many frustrations. Finally, when we saw the regime was being consolidated and that sacrifice would be useless, we decided to quit. I went to work; I tried through work to restore my emotional balance."

'Colonel Jefferson Acted on His Own Account'

[Question] Were you connected with Colonel Jefferson's guerrilla war?

[Answer] I learned about his activities on the radio. He was not really a guerrilla. He was a very emotional person, very moody and we did not trust him. So in our early conspiracies in Uruguay we sort of left him out and, being resentful about this, he decided to take the initiative. I regret that he has not taken responsibility, in saying he acted under my inspiration and my orders. All of us there realized he had taken a personal, isolated position, without our knowledge. He even tried to deceive many people in Rio Grande, using my name improperly.

[Question] It was always said that you received money, funds, and there were even accusations about your use of these funds.

[Answer] This is a very good thing to explore. There is no group of exiles anywhere in the world that does not receive help. From their own country; from entities; from institutions; from governments sympathetic to those persecuted.

Reconciliation With Jango Shortly Before His Death

[Question] Did you have financial problems?

[Answer] Well, we all had our difficulties, but I was not among those with the biggest problems. I had to sell everything I had here. I received help, not only from Cuba, which was a gift from a great friend of ours who is now dead, but also from other sources. From entities in Holland, Sweden.... I never denied this. Some day I want to make a report--I have all the documents--about this period, when the wounds are healed. Even the Farrapos did not fail to negotiate aid or loans from abroad.

Because of his differences with Jango, Brizola and the former president were in Uruguay for about 10 years without seeing one another:

"But we reconciled a few months before Jango died. We met by accident and talked together for 2 and 1/2 hours. It was a very spontaneous dialog and I have been trying since he died to reconstruct this conversation, because he expressed some thoughts that later became very significant. For example, Jango said to me:

"'Brizola, we will never return through the efforts of the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement]. We have many friends there. But if we wait for the MDB we will never return. We might even return through the efforts of the ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] or of the military. But if we wait for the MDB we well never return.'

"That was his conviction. And this is the way gauchos reconcile--half accusing each other; Jango said:

"'It's your fault, Brizola, because you have given them your support. During the Broad Front you were with them. Recall that during the Broad Front the MDB was officially opposed.'

"And he even said to me (See how prophetic he was!):

"'Of course, they will come here when we are buried. And will do us great honors. They will make grand speeches at our graves. But we will return through the efforts of the ARENA or even of the military.'

"I am trying to reconstruct this conversation because it contains some valuable and spontaneous things."

Brizola was expelled from Uruguay in 1977. "I always encouraged my sons to return to Brazil, even to do military service." He lived in the interior in Durazno, "without either electric lights or telephone, where I had a small farming and livestock complex: I raised sheep, cows; I planted oats, wheat and sunflowers and introduced soybeans." Expulsion caught him by surprise. "I wanted to return to Brazil, as I had no desire to roam the world." But Brizola was inspired by

President Carter's human-rights policy. There the governor who had expropriated Electric Bond and Share and ITT decided to "make a test. If they admit me I will go; it is the only alternative. If not, I return to Brazil." They instructed him to wait 24 hours in Buenos Aires. It was to clean the computer at Kennedy Airport. He relates:

"I was to find a very different world. I was very isolated in Uruguay. I began to assimilate the complex and difficult international context. I was forming relationships not only in the United States but also in Europe. And I think I did a good job, one that greatly helped this liberalization project."

[Question] After the meeting in New York, Senator Pedro Simon announced that Brizola would return to Brazil to join forces. Now you are being accused of having divided forces. What happened?

[Answer] In the conversations there we discussed the idea of Senator Pedro Simon's returning to the labor party--he said that himself. That, as soon as the MDB was dissolved, he would join our party, would come with us. He later changed his mind.

[Question] Since your return to Brazil, has there been any restriction on your freedom?

[Answer] None. Absolutely none. I have come and gone everywhere freely. In traveling I have often gone alone; I walk the streets alone; I have not seen or experienced any type of restriction.

[Question] Is there any type of censorship?

[Answer] I have not been aware of any. I have not observed any restrictions, except those of a political nature, which are understandable in the democratic process and against which I have been able to defend myself.

Brizola regrets that after returning to Brazil he has left international relations on a secondary plane. "An avalanche of work has claimed our attention. But we want to strengthen our relationship with social democracy, without affiliation, without dependency, without alignment."

[Question] Will the PDT have candidates for state governments?

[Answer] At the moment, we intend to have candidates for governor of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul. As for the others, it will depend upon the arbitrary measures that are being announced. I hope they will not prevail, because I believe in the president's good sense.

He will refuse to ratify any unwise artifice that can sully his democratization project. The government, furthermore, would be committing a great mistake, because the lost votes would be greater than the advantages the artifices may bring about. And the government party would gain stature through his conduct. If the PDS wants votes, it must take up democratization in a clean and honest way, even creating conditions so any opposition party may discuss and examine a possible coalition. Otherwise, there are restrictions. It is not good for the PDS to bluff with threats of retrogression.

About the possibility of his being a candidate for governor of Rio, Brizola says he has no personal ambition. "It would have to represent an aspiration of the people." He assumes that if he were governor, he would start "looking for funds wherever they could be found, negotiating with anyone at all." Meanwhile, he says he will study the succession "with the authentic opposition of Rio--the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Mobilization Party], the PT [Workers Party] and Dona Sandra Cavalcanti, who is organizing the PDR [Republican Democratic Party?]--in an effort to join forces."

[Question] Does the PDT already have candidates in Rio Grande?

[Answer] We have candidates for the nomination. Alceu Collares, Wilson Vargas and Getulio Dias. There we are trying to unite with the PMDB, the PT, the PP [Popular Party]. I may be the mediator, because I am not a candidate. I believe the two largest opposition parties, the PMDB and the PDT, should provide the major candidates--for governor and senator. But then we must face the facts. One of them is the renomination of Senator Brossard, which is a PMDB problem. If they decide on that, the governorship goes to the PDT. If the PMDB intends to have candidates for both positions, this could cause disunity.

Other Times, Other Ideas, Other Periods

[Question] What are the differences between the Leonel Brizola of before 1964 and the one who has just returned to Brazil?

[Answer] Naturally there have been changes in my view of our nation's problems, methods and situation. But the times have changed even more. We are living in much different times. At that time I was among those who struggled desperately to prevent what ultimately happened. The coup threats were real and we fought against them like someone who is trying to save a person being pushed from the top of a building. Now circumstances have changed and we are struggling to heal the wounds of that person who fell and thus to save his life. Many say I made mistakes. Naturally, anyone who plays a prominent role is subject to judgment. But what I did was in a spirit of good faith. It may be that I made many mistakes. But my errors were nothing compared with those made by many people who now presume to judge mine. Those who collaborated in overthrowing a constitutional government committed a serious error. President Figueiredo himself said a democracy in trouble is better than a progressive dictatorship. I view the future with hope. I think that even in these very episodes of arbitrary measures, of bombings, democratic reconstruction advanced. But the politicians face a great challenge: that of constructing an alternative. I don't think the alternative can be to the right of what we have now, because authoritarianism would lead to a very serious impasse. It would not do. And the nation cannot assimilate a view much to the left of social democracy. The nation's future is not receptive to extremism. There isn't room in Miami for the Brazilian bourgeoisie.

I want to use the years that are left to me in building the PDT, without short-term objectives. There is no stable democracy without strong parties as permanent national institutions. Parties are the people politically organized. Otherwise there is no salvation.

What Brizola Thinks of Some Politicians

Pedro Simon--"I was not on very intimate terms with the senator. When I went into exile he was a city councilman in Caxias do Sul. And during the time he was active in student politics he was among elements with which I had no connection. He has had a high-level public life. He played a great role. I expect him to take a reasonable attitude toward uniting the opposition. Anything contributing to divide the opposition will have very drastic consequences."

Tancredo Neves--"The senator is the most clear-headed and experienced personality at this stage of Brazilian life. I regret that a snake pit is forming around him: Chagas Freitas, Janio Quadros and many others. It was due to this that we did not join the same party. At a 15-minute meeting in Brasilia he would have joined the PTB, while I was still debating the name of the party."

Ulysses Guimaraes--"He is a kind of patriarch of the opposition. He is from the old PSD [Social Democratic Party]. In 1964 he was not on our side but has been taking a liberal position increasingly impregnated by social thinking. Although we may disagree on some matters, I have great personal regard for him."

Luis Inacio da Silva--"All good Brazilians should help him refine his view of our situation in a more comprehensive way. Lula should be considered a hope if we help him to be a public man representative of our times."

Paulo Brossard--"I think he refined his view of Brazil and reconsidered many of his ideas in regard to the struggles of the past. He is a respectable public man, dedicated to reconstructing the democratic order."

Joao Figueiredo--"I think he is molded by the legend that was his father. He also was persuaded to a military career, but in that he seems to me a more or less atypical figure. That is why I hope the president, with these characteristics of personality and temperament, will be responsive to the aspirations of the Brazilian people."

8834
CSO: 8142/1367

BRIEFS

CNI TORTURE CHARGES--Santiago, 3 Jul (LATIN-REUTER)--A group of lawyers today challenged the chief of the Chilean security services to answer in court the accusations of tortures made by leftist detainees charged with having carried out subversive activities. A group of nine lawyers who are defending several detainees also denied a statement made to the local press by the National Intelligence Center's (CNI) director, Gen Humberto Gordon, who claimed that the CNI does not torture anybody. General Gordon asserted that no detainee has ever been tortured since he took charge of the CNI 1 1/2 years ago. The CNI is in charge of coordinating the operations of police and security services and of fighting terrorism throughout the country. Several of the above group of lawyers belong to the Catholic Church Vicariate of Solidarity and to political parties which had been proscribed by the military government 7 years ago. In a public statement, the lawyers also pointed out that many of their defendants had been sent to CNI's secret units, where they were tortured, beaten and submitted to electric shocks on several parts of their bodies. Finally, they said that if the CNI's director wants to eliminate torture, he must answer the court's official letters asking him for explanations of the charges. [Text] [PY072147 Buenos Aires LATIN in Spanish 2300 GMT 3 Jul 81]

ABANDONED GUERRILLA CAMP--A last minute communique issued yesterday by the government's Social Communications Agency (DINACO) disclosed that members of the security forces are inspecting a guerrilla training camp in Valdivia. The communique points out that the guerrilla training camp was discovered during June by the security forces in General Neltume, Valdivia. It then points out that the members of the security forces scouted and then raided the abandoned guerrilla training camp where they found documents, toiletries, supplies and special foreign equipment. From the documents seized and the elements found at the site, it was established that the camp was occupied by approximately 15 persons, among them 2 women and 1 French citizen. DINACO adds that the persons who established this camp were presumably persons in exile who entered the country illegally and had been trained abroad. According to data collected, it is believed that the group has foreign financing and support, especially from the Soviet Union. Investigation and studies are being carried out at present to clarify this finding. The communique ends by stating that the operation carried out by the members of the security forces of the area were supported by military units which were carrying out their scheduled training in the area. [Text] [PY082644 Santiago Chile Domestic Service in Spanish 1100 GMT 8 Jul 81]

UNION LEADERS SENTENCED--Prosecutor Sergio Valenzuela has sentenced 10 political agitators of the self-styled national union coordinating board to imprisonment. The attorney reached this decision after questioning the alleged union leaders, who were then transferred from the court to the preventive imprisonment center [Centro de Detencion Preventiva], the former public jail of Santiago, under custody. The following persons have been sentenced to imprisonment: Manuel Bustos, Alamiro Guzman, Manuel Jimenez, Sergio Freihoffer, Hernan Jofre, (Luis Suarez), (Arturo Martinez), (Carlos Sopazo), (Jose Varas) and (Humberto Veigara). All these persons, in addition to Juan Sepulveda, who is currently abroad, were summoned by the Interior Ministry which has charged them with violating Article No 1 of Decree No 2034 for having arrogated to themselves the representation of workers' union without the necessary authorization as stipulated by the labor law currently in force. It should be pointed out that Bustos and Guzman had already been indicted and given a 541-day suspended sentence before this decision was taken. [Text] [PY081641 Santiago Chile Domestic Service in Spanish 1100 GMT 8 Jul 81]

UNITY WITH ARGENTINA--Salta, Argentina, 7 Jul (AFP)--In an interview published here today, Chilean President Augusto Pinochet stated that the problem of the Holy See mediation over the century-old Argentine-Chilean southern border conflict remains to be solved between the Vatican and Buenos Aires now. In statements to a special envoy of the daily EL TRIBUNO of this city--1,200 km north of Buenos Aires--published today, the Chilean president stated that despite the fact that we are not happy with the solution, we have accepted the Pope's mediation because we wish to reach an agreement. Now Argentina has to talk to the Vatican. Pinochet also pointed out the need to reach an agreement with Argentina so that the two countries may adopt a common policy in order to defend their sovereignty over the Antarctic Continent. In the interview with EL TRIBUNO, Pinochet stated that the border conflict is preventing the necessary unity between Argentina and Chile to jointly face situations such as the Soviet Union's proclamation disregarding the sovereignty of any nation over Antarctica. The chief of state added that if a foreign power makes such statements it is obvious that the solution is what Chile has been maintaining for many years now. This is that there is a need for unity between Argentina and my country to face such issues. However, reality is different, he added. [Text] [PY082052 Paris AFP in Spanish 1944 GMT 7 Jul 81]

CSO: 3010/1514

REPORTAGE ON FIDEL CASTRO'S TOUR OF EASTERN PROVINCES

Havana CUBA INTERNACIONAL in Spanish May 81 pp 22-31

[Article by Antonio Nunez Jimenez: "Fidel in the East"]

[Text] After setting up the first battalions of the Territorial Troop Militias in Guisa, the president of the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba made a tour of three eastern provinces, the scene of decisive battles against tyranny in the past and now an area in the midst of transformation. Anxious to observe progress on development plans, he visited construction projects and in the midst of references to the days of the liberation efforts, asked farmers about their living conditions. Antonio Nunez Jimenez, alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, deputy in the National People's Government Assembly and vice minister of culture, relates the details of the visit in this chronicle.

This is a chronicle of Fidel's recent visit to the three eastern provinces: Granma, Santiago de Cuba and Holguin. It was written on my knee while riding in a jeep as we bumped over mountains and plains, while seated on a rock in the Alto de Naranjo, facing La Plata, inside humble huts on the banks of the Yara, on board the "Biran" on the waters of Naranjo Bay, on the palm of my hand on the tomato farm in Colombia, Grupo de Maniabon, at party meetings, and against the backdrop of other scenes in our country, following Fidel's continuing tour among his people.

The trip began when we took off from Havana. In the plane, Fidel read the latest cables, then reviewed papers he would use at the Guisa assembly where, in setting up the regiment of the Territorial Troop Militias, he would present them with the battle flag.

As he raised his eyes from the documents he had been reviewing, he smilingly told Machado Ventura and Jose Miyar, noting the smooth flight that had allowed him to work on the airplane, "There are no potholes in this road!"

Jorge E. Mendoza, editor of the newspaper GRANMA, took advantage of the pause to show him a biography of Gen Calixto Garcia Iniguez. Fidel took a look at it and commented on the historical parallel between the two battles of Guisa waged in 1897 and 1958: identical first and last names of two of the protagonists, the same date of both battles: 30 November, and the same number of bullets confiscated: 55,000.

As we looked out the window of the airplane and saw the bedecked territory of Cuba and the projects of the revolution that are greatly changing the landscape, we realized that only from above is it possible to view the entire dimension of the accomplishments of the last 22 years: Amidst the seas of sugar cane plantations emerge the towns and Basic Secondary Farm Schools, the enormous ribbon of the National Highway already in service between the capital and Santa Clara. Toward the coastal areas are the tourist resorts and centers. The rugged coastal area of Zapata Peninsula conceals the Playa Larga and Bay of Pigs projects and hiding in the swampy areas are the canals, Guama and the coal towns. As we approached Cienfuegos, we could see its great industries: thermoelectric, fertilizer factory, the bulk sugar shipping terminal, the foundations of the nuclear powerplant, and along the eastern edge of Jagua Bay is the brand-new Hotel de Pasacaballo.

Now the landscape is rippled, grows more rugged in the Escambray Mountains, and all at once we see highways between valleys and peaks, new tourist centers on the banks of the Hanabanilla Dam, schools everywhere, new and bigger towns, modern and comfortable, coming one after the other in the Ciego de Avila and Camaguey plains, with their powerplants belching black smoke, proclaiming the drive of what may be the most efficient sugar harvest in history. Seeing Cuba from the air gives one the best perspective for capturing the accomplishments of our people in the midst of combat and struggle.

We landed in Bayamo. Here Fidel was greeted by Raul Castro, Vilma Espin, Juan Almeida, Guillermo Garcia and, among others, the five first secretaries of our party in the eastern provinces who were to accompany the commander in chief at the Guisa assembly.

"Look! It's Fidel!"

We entered Bayamo. Fidel's jeep elicited spontaneous shouts of joy from the people who had gathered on the sidewalks. "Look! It's Fidel!" they said, jumping and applauding. Then they would turn to those next to them and animatedly ask, "Did you see him?" The smiles would then turn to uncontainable pleasure. The happy scene was repeated over and over in Bayamo, Guisa and many other towns where we had occasion to pass. Some could not control their happiness and jumped and shouted for joy: "I saw him! It was Fidel!" Many parents lifted up their children to the commander in chief. The crowds constantly applauded, showing their deep affection for the man who guided them from capitalism to socialism.

When the entourage reached party headquarters, Fidel was given the daily report on the sugar cane harvest. He noted that to date, compliance with the daily schedule has been 91 percent and that it was 98 percent for that precise day. Some provinces managed 104 percent: Holguin, Granma and Santiago de Cuba.

The commander in chief noted that the harvest was going marvelously well: "It will be a historic harvest because of the efficiency of the mills."

We left Bayamo shortly after noon. At that hour, the new and threatening President of the United States was taking office in Washington. A banner over the entryway to Guisa said "Don't worry, *Comandante*; they won't come here."

The scenes of overwhelming joy were repeated over and over. There were smiles and banners among the people. Someone near us commented: "And these are just the people who remained in Guisa. Most are waiting for Fidel in the stadium, where the ceremony for the Territorial Troop Militias is to be held."

We arrived at the platform where Fidel would speak. Ahead of us were the Territorial Troop Militias organized in Bayamo and Guisa, in parade formation. In the background were the foothills of the invincible mountains.

The men and women of the Militias stood at attention, their Pepecha machine guns crossed over their chests, and without breaking formation, burst into applause when Fidel, Raul and those accompanying them greeted them from the platform.

The commander in chief presented the battle flag to the troops, who knelt down before their leader and the Sierra Maestra, its peaks vigilant, to take their oath of continuing the glorious traditions of the Liberating Army and the Rebel Army.

With visible emotion, the hero of Moncada began his speech, framed by the scenario of the Battle of Guisa. Memories of the heroic endeavor floated in the air like the oxygen we breathed. There, closeby, on the slope now called Coroneaux, are buried the soldiers Braulio Coroneaux and Guillermo Gonzalez, who died in combat in the trenches they dug in order to carry out the slogan "They Will Not Pass!"

The troops of the tyranny could not even pass over the bodies of those brave soldiers.

Historical Continuity

Fidel's speech touched upon many interesting topics, but there was one on which national independence was based and continues to be based. That is the perfect continuity of a policy of principles, from the now-distant time of the struggle for national liberation to the socialist present. That principle was the declarations, reiterated by Fidel before the new Territorial Troop Militias and transmitted by Radio Rebelde on 25 October 1958, before the final offensive of the Rebel Army: "...if the American State Department continues to let itself be dragged along by the intrigues of Mr Smith and Batista and makes the unjustified mistake of leading that country into an act of aggression against our sovereignty, then we shall defend ourselves in a dignified manner. There are duties to one's homeland that must be fulfilled, no matter what it costs (...). Threats work with cowardly, submissive people, but they will never work with men who are ready to die to defend their country."

Amidst the applause of the veterans and the new generations of soldiers, Fidel talked of the 22 years that have gone by since that time:

"As proof of continuity in the line of the Revolution and the thought of the Revolution, those declarations that we made on that 25 October 1958 can be repeated word for word today, especially those that say that 'there are duties to one's homeland that must be fulfilled, no matter what it costs.'"

In concluding his emotional words, Fidel, who was accompanied by Vilma Espin, dressed in the uniform of the Territorial Troops, went to the camp to speak with

the Bayamo and Guisa Militia members still in military formation. Affection and respect shown in the faces of the new daughters of the Marianas of the people. Fidel had a question or gesture for each one: "Where do you work?" Or he would take a rifle in his hands and observe that the clip had to be very long in order to hold more bullets. Then he went to the men's battalion in Bayamo. The identification of the people with their leader was repeated.

Tireless, again accompanied by Raul and his comrades in arms and from the party, Fidel went to the Coroneaux hillside. Fidel stopped before the tomb of Braulio and Guillermo, who seemed to be sleeping in their own trenches which they themselves dug, and solemnly paid his respects to the memory of his fallen comrades, their lives cut down by the shellfire of a Sherman tank of the tyranny. Before Fidel was the elongated Guisa valley and behind him the mountain.

The afternoon was coming to a close. The red light of the sun was hidden behind the high peaks of the Sierra Maestra. In the distance, the lights of Bayamo came on, the first capital of Free Cuba, a national monument.

Raul Castro said goodby to Fidel. The minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces headed for the municipality of the Second Front to set up the new militias in that heroic land.

12,000 New Housing Units

At 1900 hours, we headed for Bayamo, where the first secretary of our party met with the leaders of Granma Province.

During the long work session, Fidel heard the opinions of all the comrades and also brought up the most burning issues in which the people are immersed: agriculture, for example. "How much enthusiasm is there for the creation of new cooperatives in the mountains?" The people answered that to date, 26 have been founded on the basis of coffee farming and 4 for livestock raising.

"We must develop the industrialization of Granma Province," he reiterated.

Now attention turned to sports. "In these areas far from the ocean, we have to build swimming pools."

On each of the topics, Fidel asked his aides to note the practical results of the meeting.

Now it was the turn of Minister of Construction Lopez Moreno to report on the state of progress of some projects.

When it came time to discuss cultural problems, Fidel asked a vice minister about the theater, museums or art galleries. In one instance, he asked, rather sarcastically, what "dancing lights" were. He expressed interest in seeing the founding of a cultural center speeded up.

The discussion then turned to Bayamo's aquaduct and sewer system and Fidel asked: "How is the housing plan going?" He was informed that during the 5-year period, 12,000 housing units would be built here.

The comrades then turned to the most acute problems of education, to the need to build, not only more schools, but more desks. A colored diagram of a recreation park was shown with different types of recreation for children and young people. Fidel asked about the symbols explaining the complexity of the map:

"I can see on this map that the architects have replaced numbers with hieroglyphics to identify what is represented here," he said, arousing laughter.

Another diagram was brought out to show the new development plan for the city.

"When are you going to get rid of the huts around Bayamo and replace them with suitable housing?"

After learning of the many problems in the area and finding the solution to an equal number, we headed for the Yarey hillside, crowned by the architecture of a large chalet where good taste combines both precious woods and roofing of guano. Here Fidel had words of remembrance for Celia, whose taste is expressed here and in so many other constructions of the Revolution.

Seated at the broad table with comrades from the party and the presidents of the country's mass organizations, Fidel took up the issue of the need to achieve better agricultural productivity with new varieties obtained in the country or imported. He had fine produce harvested in Cuba brought to the table: tomatoes so big they looked like eggplant; cauliflower and lettuce three times the normal size; a cucumber as a Roman dagger; and other vegetables and greens previously unknown in Cuba.

Fidel relates the increase in our farm productivity to the increase in population and the objective fact that a large part of the land in Cuba is used for sugar production.

"Gentlemen, we have to say that Cuba exports enough calories in sugar for 40 million persons and we number only 10 million."

Roberto Damian, first party secretary in Granma Province, noted that Cuba has a population density of 87 persons per square kilometer, while Miguel Cano from Holguin observed that there, it is 100 inhabitants per square kilometer.

Fidel: "We have a relative population density per square kilometer greater than China!"

With Francisco Gonzalez, new vice minister for forest development and reforestation, Fidel then discussed the problems of the sector, in which socialism inherited a dramatic situation reflected in the figure of 7 percent of the national territory covered by forests and the resulting deplorable situation of the water system and erosion, problems that must be solved through a great deal of work and suitable techniques.

Eutimio, the Traitor

Caught up in memories of the War of Liberation and in answer to questions from his comrades, Fidel began to narrate episodes from the days in the Sierra Maestra.

With precise dates and names, he told about the case of the traitor Eutimio, an expert at guerrilla warfare in the early days, shortly before the famous interview with Herbert Matthews. In remembering the episode, he stated his opinion that men have something like a sixth sense that becomes especially acute in the face of danger.

"The third time that Eutimio absented himself in order to report our presence, I suspected he was a traitor and when he returned from one of those meetings, we disarmed him after he greeted us. He even had papers from Colonel Casillas in his pockets."

Now, in the light of history, we were moved to learn that that traitor slept at Fidel's side in the peaks of the Sierra Maestra, with the weapons of betrayal in his hand.

Fidel continued telling tales of the days in the Sierra, of the days when Che lay writhing on the ground with his asthma attacks because there was no medicine and how it was necessary to go to Manzanillo to get it, outwitting the vigilance of the enemy, or when, in the rain, the guerrilla fighters fasted for 3 days, when, in the wet mountains, they heard on radio the speech by General Tabernilla in which he said that there were only 12 rebels and that "they can only surrender or escape."

"We will not surrender and we will not run away," Fidel told his friends, continuing his interminable march to El Lomon, where he met with Che and later with the comrades sent from Santiago de Cuba by Frank Pais.

Telling these passionate tales, Fidel came to the attack on Uvero, where so many shots were fired that even most of the parakeets kept in cages in the barracks were killed.

Still on the subject of the war, painting a human picture, the commander in chief told how little codfish the troops had left:

"Codfish that I later ordered -- under protest from our troops -- given to the 14 prisoners we took there."

On the following day, we went from Loma del Yarey to the most remote part of the Sierra Maestra, taking the road from Bayamo, Veguita, Bartolome Maso, to the Yara Valley.

In beginning this stage of the trip, Fidel had in his hands certain documents that required his attention:

"I shall read on the way. I won't be able to see the scenery, but I have no choice."

And so it was until beyond the Bartolome Maso Powerplant, the panorama of the Sierra attracted his attention. Now it was time to inspect construction work on the highway that will connect the municipality of Bartolome Maso on the northern slopes of the Sierra Maestra with the watershed of the La Plata River, passing through Providencia, Santo Domingo and many other points that are like a rosary of the War of Liberation. The road led between the foothills of the mountain range,

crossing narrow gorges emptying into the Yara River, gorges that would be conquered by bridges and sewer pipes. Our path climbed the crests and Fidel halted the caravan of jeeps to talk with construction workers in whom he is always interested, not only because of the colossal task they are undertaking with so much determination and courage, but also because of their human problems.

After passing along the embankment, the rocky and muddy ground, we arrived at the foot of the Alto del Naranjo, facing La Plata, a peak over 1,000 meters high, where Fidel set up the General Command and Rebel Radio.

We went up the Alto del Naranjo by a narrow, muddy path through the dense woods of the Sierra, between arborescent ferns and vines. Fidel, leading the long file, climbed agilely, undoubtedly inspired by the memory of the days of the guerrilla war.

Reaching the top, still on foot, and meeting there with builders, leaders and planners, he gave instructions for the construction on that summit of a guest house for foreign delegations from which they would be able to visit, by taking the stone paths, the old General Command.

"In the future, the highway may, upon reaching this Alto del Naranjo, continue on down the southern coast, crossing the entire Sierra Maestra. In addition, we must increase patriotic excursions, especially for young people. There will be many Cubans who will want to come here and in 3 days, go as far as Turquino. Handicrafts should be promoted in this area so as to make hammocks, knapsacks, and other things that the visitors will need. Some will want to cover themselves or their hammock with a sheet of plastic just as we did in order to protect ourselves from the rain. Others will want to cook along the way."

Then Fidel added: "All Cubans have at one time or another gone to the beach for their vacation, but not to the mountains. Some people do not know how to swim but everyone knows how to walk. Many will want to hike through the Sierra."

Later, Fidel asked Lopez Moreno how the highway from Santiago to Pilon was going and whether they had solved the problems of taking the road over the foothills of Patin, Avion and Magdalena. He was also interested in seeing that the highway, of great tourist interest, would respect the natural beauty of some passes near the sea and that the plants be respected, especially the grapes along the coast.

In every instruction given by the commander in chief, special emphasis was placed on the need for construction projects in the Sierra to be minimal so as to protect nature: "Roads should be as narrow as possible so as not to harm the woods. In these areas, we must avoid pollution."

Someone suggested that the house planned at the Alto del Naranjo should be built out of wood from a nearby pine. Fidel was opposed: "This area should be harmed as little as possible."

Only after studying the details of the planned projects did our descent begin. Constantly anxious to learn, Fidel asked a mule driver: "How much does a mule cost now? Where are you from? What school are your children in?"

On a little landing facing La Plata, Fidel told of the visit made by a Yankee newsman during the war:

"That reporter seemed very strange to me; he was very quiet, scarcely asked me anything. I saw that he wasn't interested in anything, the total opposite of a newsman. I suspected that he was a spy serving the dictatorship and that his mission was to learn where we were going in order to making it easier to bomb us when we would return. I waited for the reporter to leave here and calculated how long it would take for him to get down. Then we left and indeed, they bombed La Plata the next day."

In the jeeps once again, we drove down the valley of the Yara River and then followed the river downstream. Upon reaching Santo Domingo, "on the flowering shore bathed by the Yara River," as the poet said, Fidel stopped before a hut in Santo Domingo. He greeted farmer Armando Viltres, 29. In answer to Fidel's question, Viltres said:

"The cooperatives have not come here yet." And to another: "There are 265 coffee farmers in this district."

Then the president of the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba saw two children standing before the door of a modest hut:

"What is your name?"

Magaly, 13, covered her face with her hand and bowing her head, told him her name.

"And what is your name?"

Magdalena, 15 but looking 12, tried to smile, but with difficulty.

"You both go to school, right?"

The two girls could scarcely answer, excited over so many visitors. They answered that they had reached the sixth grade. Fidel then wanted to know why they had not continued their studies. Armando Viltres told the commander in chief that the girls were given scholarships at the Camilo Cienfuegos School City in El Caney de las Mercedes, but that they had only remained 5 days because they missed their parents.

"Do you already have boyfriends?" Fidel asked.

The mulatto, slightly Indian faces of the girls turned ruddy red and covering their faces with their hands, they could only smile timidly.

"Then you don't work either?"

Since the reply was negative, Fidel pursued his line of questioning:

"Don't you want to work in order to buy some clothes?"

Fidel's generous humanity broke the barriers of noncommunication and the girls, more relaxed now, said that their father gave them money for clothes.

We continued on our way. Fidel lamented the fact that in Santo Domingo, the social conditions are still very difficult and someone commented that in spite of everything, the fact that the two girls, Magaly and Magdalena, had reached sixth grade was something that could not have been conceived of in the Sierra Maestra of prerevolutionary Cuba. Fidel insisted that more progress had to be made and that young girls such as those in the Sierra could continue their studies.

Minutes later, Fidel again stopped his jeep at the door of another hut in the Santo Domingo area, facing the Loma del Gallon del Peru that is now called the Loma del Cura.

Teacher at 14

He entered the hut. There he was greeted by two young farmers. One of them was boiling *malanga* in an old pot. Fidel asked where the father was and they answered that he had gone to take their older brother to the hospital.

"What is wrong with him?"

"His legs are weak," they said, and added: "They say it is sugar in the blood."

"How do you make your living?"

"From coffee."

In answer to another question, the two young men said that they get paid $2.20 a can for coffee this year.

Leaving the hut, Fidel commented that it is essential to do more for the farmers in the mountains and added that from upper Providencia to the lower areas, the situation had improved to an extraordinary degree, but that in the upper areas, the cooperatives had to be developed, the highway finished and new schools built.

A kilometer farther, before we reached Providencia, Fidel stopped at a little school with an enrollment of 71 children and four very young teachers. One of them looked like a child: She was only 14.

Fidel, who had not forgotten the girls in Santo Domingo, asked teacher Juana Blanco whether she was familiar with the case of Magaly and Magdalena.

"Yes. They missed their relatives a great deal and did not want to stay at the El Caney school. They only remained there 5 days. I asked them if they wanted to stay and live in my house in El Caney so that they would not have to be on scholarships, but they did not want to do that either."

Fidel, insistent when it is a matter of helping young people, asked Juana whether the stores in the area did not sell books so that young people could buy them and she said, "Never."

The commander in chief was also interested in learning whether the children in this other school did physical exercise and participated in any competition. To his satisfaction, he received a positive reply. Then he inquired about the

possibility of building a better school for the children in the area and the teachers told him of the difficulty with the distances the students now enrolled in the four schools in Santo Domingo, Pueblo Nuevo, El Naranjo and La Jeringa would have. There are 175 pupils in the schools.

Fidel asked the youngest teacher, the 14-year-old who had not yet graduated, how much she earned:

"Thirty pesos a month."

Her comrades receive 171. In answer to other questions from the commander in chief, they said that two of them ate and slept in the homes of nearby farmers, two of them at the school itself, and that they spent weekends in their respective home towns.

Observing the impoverished state of the school, the teachers told Fidel that the site was a medical clinic, but that the most recent cyclon had destroyed the school, as a result of which they gave classes there.

Tireless, Fidel visited another school and then the framework of another being built. He noted that it was small and, advised by Ministry of Construction comrades, proposed expanding it.

With the extremely valuable experience acquired in direct contact with the farm people of the Sierra Maestra, he continued his trip to Holguin, working out plans with his comrades to improve the recently observed situation. We thus traveled through Barranca, Yara and Bayamo and arrived in Holguin at night.

Self-Consumption

We stopped in Mayabe, from which we looked over the impressive landscape bathed by the light of the moon reflected in the lake formed by the dam. In the background, we could see the lights of modern Holguin and behind them, the rustic hills of the Grupo de Maniabon.

Fidel and his entourage would not rest and at a lengthy night meeting, the work continued. The leader of the revolution insisted on the diversification of agriculture, on the need for the people to eat more vegetables, and he argued:

"Sometimes it is expensive to grow vegetables, but the people also need medicine and whatever is necessary is invested in public health."

He continued along the same line: "We must not export food needed by the people. It is proper to export some items such as lobster, because the price of a ton of lobster is equivalent to 30 tons of milk, which is worth more to the health of the people."

Next he turned to the need to use the maximum land area: "I conceived of the citrus crops, not in the cane areas, but in the sandy areas of the Isle of Pines, Pinar del Rio and other zones."

The commander in chief sometimes used expressions showing his anxiousness to have a Cuba that the current state of underdevelopment does not allow us to achieve: "What we wouldn't give so that every Cuban could have his own home!"

The topic of the sugarcane harvest dominated a large portion of that meeting of comrades and Fidel repeated that it is necessary to devote complete attention so that the mills would run like clockwork.

Then he remembered the hut painted blue of the teacher he had met in Santo Domingo and Providencia: "It is the prettiest home in those mountains. As you go down the Sierra to the plains, you realize that it was the wisest settlers who went down to the flatter areas."

He expressed his desire that until new housing could be built in the Sierra, someone might at least take the paint needed to make the huts more attractive. He also touched on the need to improve the brewing of beer in Santiago de Cuba and to develop handicrafts in Holguin:

"We have to maintain good quality wherever it exists. Every 2 weeks, I make sure that the Coppelia ice cream maintains its quality, for it already has worldwide fame."

He also mentioned the need for the food industry to take better advantage of surplus products. He cited as an example that the blood from cattle slaughtered, now used to make 30 million sausages a year, was once thrown away.

The last topic on which the commander in chief spoke that night was the need to move toward self-consumption in the many cane farms in the country.

Tangible Development

On 22 January, shortly after 0930 hours, Fidel visited the city of Holguin and the surrounding area. Holguin's development is tangible and always surprises visitors.

We saw the tourist park and then drove in front of the modern El Valle, El Bosque and Pernik hotels, the new districts, with their magnificent architecture and attractive colors, then to the brand-new stadium, before reaching the impressive mausoleum where the remains of Maj Gen Calixto Garcia Iniguez lie.

Here Fidel paid his solemn respects. On both sides of the tomb, a total of 17 palm trees symbolize the 17 generals of the Liberation Army born on the soil of Holguin. Above, a statue signifies the continuity of the liberating act from Cespedes to Fidel.

In front of the mausoleum is the new building going up to house the party in the province. Comrade Miguel Cano told Fidel of projects and prospects in Holguin.

In a few minutes, the excursion continued on to Naranjo Bay. The scenery through which we drove could not have been more beautiful: peaks standing like limestone domes against the blue sky, overlooking waving fields of green. On the left, we passed before the Silla de Gibara and on the right, we saw the Mezquita de Colon, the mountain so praised by Admiral Colon when he arrived in Cuba for the first time.

When we reached the shores of the bay, the landscape opened up into a basin flooded by the deep azure of the water. The bay seemed to be a lake of saphire-blue waters. Cano told us that oysters were cultivated here and that an aquarium was being built in the water.

The "Biran" awaited us at a tiny pier. Before the impressive landscape of the bay, made even more beautiful by a rocky cove covered with woods, Fidel noted how essential it is to preserve the purity of the environment and protect it from pollution:

"In the cities, civilization, and in the country and near the sea, the rustic, so as to prevent the pollution and destruction of the scenery," Fidel commented.

We sailed over the bay to its mouth. On our way, we observed long awnings where mangrove roots covered with oysters would be hung. Observing one of the many roots covered with oysters, Fidel noted that it looked like a flower.

Facing the mouth of the bay are small keys, among which marine areas have been fenced off for octopuses, brilliantly colored peacock fish, red *carajuelos* and other marine species.

We landed on the keys. The breeze from the sea refreshed us. We breathed the pure air in a transparent, sunny atmosphere. The environment caused us to speak of the need to protect our nature, often mistreated by the poor use we have made of our environment. Talk grew animated with an invitation from the aquarium director to taste the delicious oysters grown in Naranjo Bay. Talk then turned again to the sugar cane harvest.

Speaking about the cane, Fidel said: "We used to confuse the product with the owners, with large landholdings, with the exploitation of man by man, but the truth is that the sugar cane has been freed just as we have. Not only does the cane yield sugar so that the people may live, but it also gives bagasse to make boards and it yields fuel."

Fidel said he was content and optimistic: "We have reached maturity. We are all developing ideas, culture and methods for facing development. With that experience, this year we are going to have laid the foundations for better future harvests."

From Naranjo Bay, once again we headed for Holguin City and then for the "clear water" zone on the highway to Gibara, where Fidel was interested in seeing the experimental 2-caballeria field [1 caballeria = 33.2 acres] of tomatoes of the Bolivar variety.

"You Have Nothing"

Through the palm trees and the hills, we arrived at the Colombia farm, the small property headed by Celso Gonzalez, veteran of the Liberation War, a soldier from the 16th Column. He is 55, a man who, in Fidel's presence, removes his cap from his greying hair, with all his good *guajira* breeding, in order to show respect and affection.

Fidel learned what Celso obtains with his techniques and only 10 men: up to 8,500 quintals of beautiful tomatoes per caballeria (1 caballeria = 13.2 hectares), tomatoes that sometimes weigh up to six pounds. Celso says that he has sometimes obtained 30,000 quintals per caballeria planted with staked tomatoes.

Fidel exchanged his experiences in growing Bolivar tomatoes with Celso and informed him that he already had several generations of the extraordinary variety planted.

We walked over the black ground with its narrow irrigation trenches. Celso and Fidel bombarded one another with questions about tomato growing and through their answers we learned that in this experimental field, sprinking is not used because as Celso said, "sprinking washes off too much pollen."

The leader of the revolution emphasized the need to obtain all the seed. "We pick them and put them in boxes," Celso told him.

Fidel thanked the farmer, who has shown so much wisdom in the complex task of tomato growing.

Because of Fidel's interest in the experiments being done, he asked whether Celso were teaching anyone. "Everything is being written down, Sir," Celso answered.

Fidel said that all the production from that experiment should be used for seed and asked: "Don't you need anything to continue these very important crops?"

"Nothing," Celso answered, "I have everything I need."

But Fidel wanted to see for himself every last detail of the tiny farm and in visiting a small guano shed, he discovered that the fertilizer spreader was a mere box placed behind the tractor. It could not have been more rudimentary and Fidel told him, "But you have nothing, Celso."

He then visited the small shed for meteorological instruments that Celso uses to predict the weather.

The chief of state of the Republic of Cuba then said goodby to farmer Celso Gonzalez, who tells his commander in chief: "For me it has been a great honor that you have visited me, Sir."

11,464
CSO: 3010/1465

NATIONAL FORUM CONTINUES DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS

PA070200 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1502 GMT 5 Jul 81

[Discussion at the forum on national problems by government delegates commander of the revolution Carlos Nunez, coordinator of the government delegation; Nathan Sevilla of the Sandinist National Liberation Front; government alternate delegates Carlos Garcia Caracas, of the People's Social Christian Party, Alejandro Gutierrez of the People's Action Movement; Ariel Bravo and Eduardo Coronado; opposition delegates Donald Castillo of the Nicaraguan Workers Federation, coordinator; Alvaro Jerez of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, Adan Fletes, chairman of the Social Christian Party; Roberto Urros of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement; Jose Davila of the Social Christian Party; Rodrigo Solorzano of the Social Democratic Party and Mario Obieda; with moderator Julian Corrales--live]

[Excerpts] [Corrales] The session is hereby opened. The topic for today's debate is: The armed institutions.

An agenda has been prepared as a guideline with subtopics as follows:

1. Composition and functions of the armed forces, their training, remuneration and strength;

2. The Sandinist People's Militias [MPS] and their role;

3. The police force, public order and participation in the defense of the revolution;

4. The coercive action of the Revolutionary Government to save the country from counterrevolutionary and criminal threats;

5. The armed forces-party relationship and participation in politics, and

6. Military expenditures and production costs.

[Sevilla] The economic power of a few was substantially undermined by the triumph of the people and the people's assumption of political power. However, in what few hands is economic power concentrated today? The people, the forces of the

revolution, answer that question by reminding us that there are still vestiges of large landholdings and owners of large factories who still have an important part of the economy concentrated in a few hands. Those are the sectors that rise up to demand democracy from the people's government, to demand a number of conditions from the people's government, conditions that they describe as the appropriate climate for operating, the appropriate climate for unity.

Of course, if we are in a forum here where the patriotic, revolutionary, truly democratic sectors are trying to find points of concurrence to advance the process of change, we should logically expect that not just the forces of revolution, but also those forces that dissent from the revolution or its leadership will make a vigorous statement to the effect that those vestiges of economic power, with wealth concentrated in a few hands, the millionaires, should have their property confiscated for the people's benefit.

When we say for the benefit of the people, we are referring to laborers, peasants, small landowners and small producers and we are talking about organizing the entire system for the distribution of wealth to make it favor the worker and peasant, the middle classes and small and medium producers.

These forces, which are the motors or the real propellers of the revolution, are also interested in having businessmen operating in this country submit to the rules established by the revolution, because it is the only way for the patriotic, popular forces to walk along with those businessmen who adopt patriotic stances in the framework of national unity.

[Fletes] In his statements on the armed forces, Companero Jose Davila spoke of s[illegible]gthening the armed forces and encouraging them to fulfill the program of t[illegible] Government of National Reconstruction. After Jose Davila's statements, there hav[illegible] been some who, through propaganda, have sought to induce us to eliminate Sandinism. We are not going to fall into that trap, because to us the survival of Sandino's thinking and its specific application to Nicaraguan reality represents the salvation of the revolution.

We have pointed out on various occasions the relationships between parties and armies that have caught our attention, not only in the Nicaragua case, but in general. We think that an army should never be identified with a particular political party, whether the party is Social Democratic, Social Christian or communist. [eight-minute break in transmission due to power failure.]

[Unidentified speaker] The armed forces--The Sandinist People's Army, EPS--must be seen as an organization that defends a number of postulates, of basic principles, among which is the defense of the revolutionary process.

This means, therefore, that the EPS must be viewed, not as a continuation of former armed forces, but rather as the complete negation of the now defunct Nicaraguan National Guard. It is a negation of the guard. It has completely erased it. In fact, the internal relations between top EPS officials and the lower ranks are completely different.

Something else must also be considered. The EPS shares the definition applied to the revolution: democratic--the EPS is democratic--and popular--the EPS is made up, as it states here, of the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN] fighters, of the soldiers and officers who have behaved honestly and patriotically in the face of the corruption, repression and servilism of the dictatorship.

Therefore, the EPS is made up of all those who fought against the regime and those who, as capable citizens, have wished to join it.

[Jerez] I believe that there is something very important regarding the armed forces. They must be looked at in a comprehensive and objective way. I believe that the creation of the armed forces within the revolutionary plan is very well defined in Chapter 1 of the government program, where the armed forces are specifically mentioned. They are mentioned in Articles 24, 25, 26 and 27. The police and other armed organizations are mentioned in these articles. We believe that the creation of the armed forces must be based on the government program because its validity is real and objective. We have said this before. The armed forces must be pluralistic in order to give them their institutionality and permanence with the support of all sectors of the population. They must have a pluralistic nature permitting the citizens in the armed forces to choose their own ideology and political stand.

When Article 25 says that the members of the armed forces cannot be involved in political campaigning, this does not mean that they are denied the political rights that they have as citizens and Nicaraguans.

If we saw that this pluralism was not being carried out, we would be having the problem that....[interrupted by the indistinct statements of somebody in the background] if the army was not pluralist we would be making a great mistake, because this means that we would be asking the people to support and back members of a specific political party. It seems to me this would be a great mistake, because the armed forces need the support and cooperation of all the people in order to carry out their duties correctly. The duties of these armed forces, within these pluralist characteristics, include three very important ones. First, something which is institutional in all the armies of the world, as Companero Bravo said: the defense of sovereignty and of territory, and the other which in our revolutionary state means: defense of the democratic process. We asks: Well, what is this democratic process? What is understood by that? We understand that defense of the democratic process means that the armed forces, within their pluralist nature, will prevent forces which are not under the control of any of the organizations present here, from returning to Somoza, establishing a dictatorship or returning to oppression and exploitation.

This defense of the democratic process also means guaranteeing and supporting the government, whoever happens to be running this government. This means that only the organizations that support the revolutionary process will be in this government--not by their decision, but by popular vote. Our people will not vote for anybody who does not have the ability or who does not have the spirit to continue and to deepen a revolutionary process that was created and built by all the organizations of this country. Then, we have the three areas of the armed forces, within their membership and functions, and specifically the most important

one, which is the one that was worrying Ariel [Bravo]: the defense of the democratic process as defined here. Regarding this, in order to have this, the armed forces must: 1) not have a direct relationship with a political party; and 2) not leave any doubt as to this relationship even in their names. For this reason we proposed the name: Army for the Defense of National Sovereignty, as Sandino called his army. In this way, we are truly preserving the ideal and the original Sandinist concept that General Sandino tried to build.

I want to add that this idea is applicable to the other armed organizations, except that we feel there is no reason for the people's militias to exist within the government program. What we should have is what we proposed: obligatory military service. The militias also have a party connotation and it would be a mistake to let them have the support of only one sector of the population and not all of them, which is so necessary for the militias to function correctly.

[Nunez] The goals and objectives which make up the national nature of the armed forces include their organization, specialization, defense of our sovereignty, education, ties with the people and integration. Then what I find very strange in that position is not an attempt to eliminate Sandinism in our country but to argue that the FSLN must be considered just another force in the revolutionary process and that once its role has been completed--ignoring what was established in the proclamation of the junta of the Government of National Reconstruction--it must just become another organization. Therefore, what is meant is that when the word Sandinist is used, it is giving a party connotation or is affecting the national nature of an organization. So in order to oblige this request, the name Sandinist must be taken off and the armed forces must be called something else. Reducing the national nature of the armed forces to an adjective or reducing its nature to a simple connotation which only means combativeness or the combination of an inheritance of a struggle that the people carried out against the dictatorship is simple an inconsistent argument that leads nowhere. However, this argument does reveal the truth of the matter: the manifest desire to ignore the belligerent and dynamic nature and the leadership ability of the FSLN during the time that it fought against the dictatorship, drafted a program to rebuild the country and publicly stated its desire to carry out this program with the definite support of the people. This is what I think lies at the bottom of all this.

[Davila] I will refer to some words of Nathan when he said that during the time of Somozism economic power was concentrated in the hands of a few. That is true and we always denounced it. Furthermore, we have expressed concern over a certain trend today of the state becoming the sole proprietor. This is not advisable for Nicaragua's development; it is not advisable for the state to become the only negotiator, the sole proprietor, the only trend-setter, placing all Nicaraguans, peasants, workers, vendors, and so forth, at the service of the state. We do not agree with this.

Nowhere in our comments on the armed forces--as has been hinted here, as have some members of the media--have we said anything negative about the armed forces. On the contrary, at the heart of our position is the defense of the armed forces. We want the armed forces to carry out their national role, as do all the

Nicaraguan people. Our exposition is intended deep down to defend the armed forces because we do not agree that the armed forces, the soldiers, the army members should have a single, political, partisan indoctrination.

We believe that the revolutionary army promotes the process of changes and, together with the people, achieves the modernization of the political, economic and social structures of the country and is ready to defend the achievements of the process of change of which it has been a protagonist.

We believe that it is important to state our position on the points that have been presented. We must try to get to the bottom of things. It is right here in our country where we understand what the role of the armed forces should be, how they should be constituted and what role they should have. In the case of Nicaragua, we believe that the formation, organization and conduct of the people's army can guarantee the interests of the majority. And it is imperative to find ways to increasingly strengthen the ties of unity between the peoples and the armed forces. Therefore, I raise this concern so we can see whether we want to defend the armed forces, which are left over from the past and which we still see traces of, or the armed forces of the new Nicaragua which belong to the reality of today.

[Urroz] We want the entire government program to be fulfilled. That has really been the problem in the country because it is a fact that the government program has not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, we hope that after the signing of the 19 points of concurrence which recognize that government program, the fundamental statute and the guarantees of the Nicaraguans, these points will be fulfilled as specified so that all Nicaraguans can march toward a society in which we can live in permanent peace and reconstruct our country, enjoy real democracy and experience the revolution of the Nicaraguans.

[Fletes] We support the armed forces. We believe that there is a large group in the armed forces that sympathizes with the positions that we maintain in favor of democracy, freedom, pluralism, anti-imperialism in the face of the United States and the Soviet Union, and social changes.

That is why we have become deeply concerned after reading a report in a local newspaper and after hearing talk about a purge in the armed forces. We believe that this purge is dangerous if it is not defined. We believe that the people's freedom to express an opinion in favor of any ideology in any armed forces institution must not be affected. If the beliefs of Sandino and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro were fully applied in our country, our people would be completely united and our situation right now would be very different.

We have pointed out the need for the separation between party and armed forces. Commander Nunez has been right in this. We do not think that the Sandinist front is an organization that is always right. We do not think that the Sandinist front is an organization which cannot make mistakes. We think that it was successful in the development of the insurrection but that it has made a mistake in leading this government. If an organization that leads a process makes a mistake, then other organizations should legitimately be able to discuss with the people the possibility of leading the Nicaraguan revolutionary process.

[Solorzano] We have been accused by the official communications media of defending a single economic class. We respond by saying that we are workers, we are professionals, we represent a broad range of Nicaraguan thinking--drivers, parents, mechanics, food sellers, students, farmworkers, industrial workers--who are exploited, as has been said. This is a political and economic exploitation, as in the use of the armed forces for political ends, the use of public goods for the service of a single party, as in the demonstrations where they use trucks and other material that are public property. Also, there is the use of the mass media to defend the interests and purposes of a single organization.

The gentlemen of the other side should not be deceived, we have people of all the classes--economic and social. Exactly how many will be known by the people when national elections are held, just elections free of pressure and based on a secret ballot. Meanwhile, they can go out on the street, without uniforms and without arms, to hear what the people, of whom they speak so much, have to say. They will realize that those mechanics, drivers, housewives and food sellers are not a mass; they think and have opinions and they do not agree with a lot that is said and done by the current government.

[Nunez] There are three points here which drew my attention.

First, one of the considerations raised by Jose Davila concerns the growth of military spending but at the same time he contradicts himself when later on he says that there is no data or information on the growth of military spending, and so forth. Nevertheless, he makes the affirmation. I have heard their arguments when they speak of 30,000 and 40,000 numbers which we have only heard abroad based on speculation.

Second, in a ridiculous way they try to deprive the state security organizations of the rules of security which exist in any country of the world for this type of organization. It would seem as if Companero Jose Davila needs to ask a little more about this.

Third, they even propose not making arrests at night or in the early morning. I understand that this has been proposed so the citizens will not be bothered. But Companero Davila would have to assure us that these citizens are not going to flee and that they will wait until 0800 for us to go and knock on their doors after they have been discovered or while they are engaged in activities.

I want to clarify all this, so that they won't speak later of manipulation. I am referring specifically to the struggle against civilian crime, to the struggle against counterrevolutionary crime which does not rest and works around the clock. These are considerations which deal with security and it appears as if they want to tell us what conspiracy is.

All of these issues revolve around one central thing. First, I maintain that there is an intention to separate the FSLN from the process or at least to say that enough time has gone by for the FSLN to become another party, or as on one occasion when it was said--I do not recall who said this--its military struggle has reached a certain point where it should just be quiet and let others take

command. Second, there is undoubtedly concern by the other sector because the armed forces are the FSLN's most formidable pillars. Its firmest guarantees are the combatants of the period of struggle, outstanding and characteristic chiefs who proved themselves as true militants of the FSLN. The concern then arises regarding the bands and there is concern over the presence of this type of combatant.

The other sector even proposes here that it is time that different political groups should be brought into the armed forces to ensure the education of the army because the sector on the other side does not trust the FSLN. However, not only would this affect national sovereignty. It would also be paving the way for division, and hinder the fundamental tasks which the armed forces have at this moment. It would affect the commands and military discipline; Particularly at a time now when we have a specific objective. The armed forces made up in this way would immediately have to respond to the 1,000 varied ideas and the 1,000 differences, upheld by the various political organizations. It has been said here that there is no trust in the FSLN and that there is a fear that the militants of the FSLN and the combatants of the struggle period will not maintain the seal of integrity of their armed forces. I raised all these considerations in order to reach these conclusions.

[Jerez] Carlos Nunez has said that a Sandinist orientation must be given to the armed forces. But our criticism is precisely that: that 2 years after the revolution that orientation has not been given correctly to the armed forces. I will give you specific examples. The police have not received adequate orientation, or it has not been given correctly, because they have misunderstood it. When they are taught about Sandinism they think that it is Sandinism as a political party. We have mentioned regrettable events in the recent past, such as the Nandaime incident, when the police only defended those who were with the Sandinist Front and not the citizens who had an ideology different from the Sandinist Front or who did not carry the acryonym of the FSLN but of other political movements. I think that is where the mistake lies. When the police are given a partisan orientation they think their only obligation is to defend the members, militants or citizens who support that ideology or political organization.

What we are questioning is the connotation given by the government junta in Decree 67, which states that the term "Sandinist" is only applied to the FSLN's party organizations. That is where the problem lies. No one is questioning Sandinism as such. No one is questioning the validity and existence of a political party called the Sandinist National Liberation Front. What we are asking is: Why should the national armed forces belong to a party by decree? Therefore, there are only two alternatives. Either the name of the armed forces should be changed so they will not be partisan and instead will represent all the Nicaraguans, or Decree 67 should be abrogated so that the word Sandinist will not denote just one party and instead can be used by all the Nicaraguans who feel they are part of the Sandinist spirit.

There is also an attempt to confuse the people when there is talk of state security. Actions against common crime do not fall within the functions of the state security. They fall within the functions of the police. State security has another function.

This is a big problem. We have stated in the document that its functions and its relationship with the legal apparatus must be defined. No one is saying here that we should be told the names and addresses of all the members of the state security organization. I think that would be naive and a case of playing with syllogistic arguments. What we are saying is that the functions of the state security should be defined. The functions of all the world's security bodies have been defined. That sometimes they overstep those functions is another thing, but their functions are defined. What we are trying to prevent is the terrorizing of the people, who remember the very recent past when Somoza's security office arrived at their homes at all hours of the night, terrorizing families and children with raids. That is what we want to prevent, as much as possible, so that arrests will not take place in the middle of the night.

We want to summarize this in five clear and specific ideas: 1) we consider the armed forces as valid in their social activities. We believe they should exist, be institutionalized and well paid. The soldier should really be well paid, have a decent life, be able to support his family in a decent manner and have the right to professional training; 3) [as heard] the composition of the armed forces must be in line with what is contemplated in the government program. When we say that they should be pluralistic and Carlos says that this would create divisions and factionalism in the army and that the armed forces would lose their function, then only two alternatives are left: either the armed forces should be given a pluralistic education, one of different ideologies so that when the soldiers return to civilian life they can support any ideology, or the armed forces should not be given any political training and they should simply be given a general education within a military and social program. In other words that they not be given any political ideology, which I think runs counter to the rights of citizens. Their functions should be defined as we have previously pointed out. That is, they should prevent the violation of our sovereignty and borders by foreign forces. They should guarantee and support the governments that will lead this revolution in the future, regardless of who are the people in power, as long as they move forward this revolutionary plan. They should guarantee the rights of each and every citizen of this country and not only of those who belong to a given political organization or who support a given ideology.

[Castillo] I would like to mention several cases in reference to the statement by Carlos Nunez, who said that only criminals and counterrevolutionaries (?are arrested). I want to mention the cases of Carlos Pilar, Santos Martinez and other companeros who were taken out of their homes at 0200 and arrested on the charge of being counterrevolutionaries. They are leaders of the Federation of Nicaraguan Workers [CTN]. I would also like to say that companeros in other work centers have been arrested solely for demanding their rights, which had been established in decrees and also in collective contracts. There are companeros who have been arrested for this and are still in jail.

There is also the fact that the CTN leaders cannot get near the Javier Guerra Sugar Mill because if they go they are arrested. If I go I will be arrested, as they did once. I wanted to point this out because it has been said that only criminals and counterrevolutionaries are arrested. If we, in the specific case of the CTN, are sitting down at this table it is because we are trying to have the voice of all the urban and rural workers heard and achieve their

participation. Therefore, we cannot be placed in the same bag as the counterrevolutionaries. In the 19 points of concurrence we have signed, the two delegations have defined who the counterrevolutionaries are.

[Davila] Sometimes I wonder why we are really participating in this forum, because I see that Nathan's [Sevilla] recent line is characterized by the twisting of arguments for his own benefit, which to a certain extent he then uses for purposes of manipulation. I do not think that is a good line, Nathan. Then there is the matter of seeking ways to improve this forum, which we regard as basic. A tyranny of words exists here. By this I mean that things are being said somewhat mechanically.

It is being said, for instance, that the army is to be educated in the postulates of Sandinism. Yet it has not been either clearly or fully explained here what these postulates are. It should be explained whether they mean nationalism, democracy of anti-imperialism. If, on the other hand, the postulates of Sandinism means a tendency to have a single labor federation, a single party, proletarian dictatorship or class hatred, this too should be explained. In the end, this tyranny does not allow us to see clearly what the words of each one of us mean. As far as I am concerned, this is the basic problem about the use of the term Sandinist: that the Sandinist front has refused to define its ideology clearly. We admit that Sandinism has a national connotation, but sometimes I think some other ideology that has not been clearly defined might be concealed behind Sandinism. I think this tyranny of words is affecting us quite a bit.

[Bravo] Many of you are concerned about the election. Apparently, that is basic to you. It would seem that is everything for you. It would seem that both the Sandinist People's Army [EPS] and the armed forces should have been created for that purpose, when in truth the present revolutionary process has implemented many revolutionary measures which have not yet been fulfilled. I think, [Jose] Davila, that it is even dishonest to blame the junta of the Government of National Reconstruction and even the Sandinist National Liberation Front for the fact that there are problems and that it has not been possible to distribute land. In fact, neither the junta of the government nor the Sandinist front or anybody else for that matter is responsible for such a enormous issue, as you seek to suggest.

One of you asked whether there would be a purge of the state apparatus. I think that is correct. Many infiltrated individuals are harming the revolutionary process. Yes, harming it, by not obeying the provisions adopted, / doing as they please, by creating problems. Do you not agree that this must be resolved? This is the origin of the very mistakes that you yourselves have pointed out. So why Adan's [Fletes] question and concern? Why the question, if it is necessary to correct from its very roots the origins of a very big problem, which is characterized by waste and all the other things that you have mentioned in connection with the state apparatus? Now that we are going to adopt specific measures, you are upset. Now you are upset, you ask questions and even citing quotes.

Let us go on to the armed forces. There will be a cleanup there, too. Only a naive person can believe there are no problems of that type, as well as problems dealing with conduct and even with morality, within the armed forces. It too must be cleaned up. Measures must be adopted. They are to be revolutionary measures.

You talk about the militias and say compulsory military service is better. It is all very elementary, however. The Sandinist army alone is determined not to let anyone pass, but it needs the support of the people, organized in the militias. The people's militias are a guarantee of victory against any aggression against this country, either internal or from abroad. I am not personally asking you to stop being a Social Christian or Social Democratic, or demanding that you become a communist or Sandinist in order to be in the workers' organization today discussing the issue of unity on the bases of equality. Since you are in the outside, you and the CUS expose yourselves to misinterpretation. The theoretical scheme you have for the Sandinist people's militias, if put into practice even in good faith, certainly appears to be counterrevolutionary.

[Obiedo] We are also concerned about the purge that will allegedly be carried out in the army. It seems to us that we are returning to purges that we had already overcome and that there will be a witch hunt to see who is more revolutionary and who has been accused of not being fully identified with the revolution. I believe that we should be cautious in this regard and respect the pluralist nature that the army may have so that any army member can have his own ideology as long as he is a disciplined member and does not alter the orders and regulations of his institution.

[Nunez] Regarding obligatory military service, this matter, as is known publicly, was one of the goals initially contemplated in the armed forces. However, to speak of this obligatory service in real terms means getting organized correctly, overcoming several circumstances and implementing it. The military service has rules and regulations that are also needed by our country in order to strengthen the tasks for production.

[Garcia] I would like to bring up two points which are interrelated: one refers to army pay and the other to the militias. It has been said here that the army should be supported through a compulsory military service. Let us consider the economic and practical aspects of the issue. Economically, it would be impossible for us to mobilize the 30,000 or 40,000 men needed for the defense of our sovereignty through compulsory military service without paying them. We cannot afford to maintain such a force on the payroll for 2 years, which is the minimum time for military service.

The militias, on the other hand, are only paid when on duty, and this has already been channeled through state or private entities. This would mean having an army prepared for battle while at the same time engaged in production activities, without remuneration. This would be the practical aspect of the issue. There are precedents in defense matters, such as the case of Egypt in 1967, where the government failed to provide the army with political orientation and to mobilize the people through the militias. This resulted in an Israeli victory over the Egyptian forces in 6 days.

[Urroz] In his exposition, Gutierrez referred to the possibility of reducing the people's army providing the people's militia were increased at the same time. Our proposal, however, referred to a reduction in the size of the army if we

implemented the government plan's provisions through the military service. He also referred to a broader concept regarding what the government plan points to as the defense of the democratic process. In this respect, we want to state that any concepts different from those of the government plan, as agreed in our points of concurrence, must be subject to broad consultation by all sectors, so we may all contribute to the adoption of decisions whenever any change of the plan may be beneficial for the people.

[Gutierrez] Instead of talking about defending the entire population, we should direct our efforts basically to defense of the interests of the workers and peasants. If these changes have not all been made it is because there are forces opposing them, which have even threatened the stability and sovereignty of the country. No one can say the revolutionary forces have not made every effort to make the changes necessary to benefit those large sectors of our population.

Let us make a common front against all sectors opposed to these changes and against imperialist aggression, against all decapitalizing maneuvers by the various social sectors opposed to the economic, social, and cultural changes which benefit the great masses of our country. Thus we can truly work to benefit these great masses rather than engage in demagoguery. We must attack the causes of the problems which are found in this country in imperialist aggression, sabotage, and the resistance of the reactionary sectors of our country.

[Nunez] With regard to the armed forces, I believe that the first point we should bear in mind is that the armed forces must be educated, on the one hand, in military art, especially that part referred to or which should be considered the spearhead of the defense of the revolution, that is, its army, the Sandinist People's Army, which as such should be skilled in all modes of combat and in the specialties of the various branches that make up any army in the world, depending on the specific conditions of its country, its requirements and its needs.

[Fiallos] I have drafted several simple ideas to try to set something up for Thursday's meeting.

1. The armed forces should receive basic training within the thought of Sandino and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, complemented by easy access, at the military education centers themselves, to knowledge of the various ideological trends existing in Nicaragua through lectures and courses established in the study programs and through books and pamphlets readily available to them. The education of the armed forces will not consist of unique or biased ideological training.

2. The defense of sovereignty is not independent from the defense of pluralism, liberty, democracy, human rights, nonalignment or the welfare of workers.

3. The armed forces must always defend us, with the full support of the people, from everything that attacks: 1) our self-determination; 2) our sovereignty; 3) democracy; 4) liberty; 5) pluralism; 6) human rights; 7) nonalignment, and 8) the welfare of workers.

I propose these simple concurrences so that we may work on them for next Thursday.

[Moderator] So far, there have been specific proposals that express the thoughts of the members of both delegations or of entire delegations to be considered as points of concurrence. To this effect, and before the final explanations just before concluding, we remind you that it is our duty to present the draft of minimal concurrences for both delegations at the meetings they will have on Thursday and of course, both delegations will make their own analyses of the proposals of each of these companeros. Our next meeting is scheduled for next Saturday at 0900, when we will continue to debate a new topic within the general area of politics. This new topic, which we can revise according to the agenda, is political liberties. Liberty of press is included.

On this, we would like the following: If there is a guest speaker--and there appears there is--we would like to have the text ahead of time, if possible on Friday by noon at the latest, and we agree to reproduce it so that all may follow it as the person speaks, having the document in their hands. The other thing is that if there are also going to be speakers on the part of the delegations, that they also forward these documents so that through each of its members, the forum may have the necessary reports and data in order to have adequate information and we may also offer the support required, giving each person the copy that must be analyzed, outlined or discussed.

We now offer the floor for the closing, for any explanations that may be necessary.

[Nunez] I merely wish to remind you that the next weekend's mechanics would be similar to those we used this time, with the difference that in this case the special exposition will be up to the companeros. It will be up to them to bring the special guest and each delegation will be given a right to its own exposition.

[Moderator] Agreed. Companeros, the session has ended.

CSO: 3010/1512

'MUNDO OBRERO' INTERVIEWS INTERIOR MINISTER BORGE

FM061534 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 26 Jun-2 Jul 81 pp 26-28

[Interview with Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge by Luis G. Sanchez and J. Morales: "Guns Are Useless Without People's Support"--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] You have been accused by your opponents of wishing to expropriate more land and to assert yourselves in an authoritarian manner in this country. Nevertheless, some multinationals are still operating here, there are private enterprises and also private estates, there is freedom of expression and you allow political parties to function. What are the grounds for these accusations?

[Answer] With all the things that are said about us a writer could produce a novel. There are those who say that the level of Lake Azozoca is falling because we are taking the water to Cuba. Did you know that a group of young peasants upcountry rose up in arms because they were told that the government was going to enact a law whereby we would shoot people when they reached the age of 30? One day a U.S. congressman, Mr Murphy, said that we had shot the prisoners in Tipitapa Prison. Some people believe that it is true that I bought myself a piece of land in the center of the city of San Jose, Costa Rica. In addition, there are the stories that we eat children fried, that we are going to deprive parents of parental authority.... And of course, if people start such crude stories, is it surprising that they should place a label on the revolution? Since the Sandinist National Liberation Front was founded 23 July 1961, an event whose 20th anniversary we celebrate in July, we have said what we are. We have said that we are Sandinists. But what is Sandinism? [It is] the thinking of Augusto Cesar Sandino, enriched by the thinking of Carlos Fonseca and the revolutionary experience of all peoples, applied to Nicaragua's specific situation. Perhaps many people are not satisfied with this ideological definition, but I believe that in the final analysis it is not labels which define revolutions. For instance, we could say that we are communists and that we are the USSR's best friends; we could even assert that our capital is Havana or Moscow.... But if we had not destroyed the National Guard, if we had not carried out the national literacy campaign, if we had not adopted revolutionary measures, if we had not liberated our country forever from exploitation and dependence, yet we said that we are communists, I believe that the most reactionary journalists and governments in the world would say: "At last some splendid communists have appeared in the world!"

But, of course, we have never said that we are communists, although we have eliminated the National Guard and the coercive instruments of the exploiter classes' domination in Nicaragua and have taken a qualitative step forward in our country's cultural development; have handed over much of the land and the industries to the people; have declared our solidarity with the peoples of Latin America; have shattered the ties with imperialism and are anti-imperialists. But we do not say that we are communists. So these Sandinists are behaving very badly even though they do not say that they are communists. It is not what you say that defines a revolution but what you do. The Sandinist Front's ideology springs from our own national roots. And Sandinism means anti-imperialism and means that the predominant classes in our country are the workers and peasants. If that, as a very dear friend of mine called Eden Pastora says--he says he does not know very well what communism is and perhaps we do not know very well--if that is communism, then we are communists.

Political Pluralism, Synthesis of Mixed Economy

[Question] Why does the mixed economy system persist in Nicaragua?

[Answer] In Nicaragua there is a mixed economy, and this is embodied in the blueprint of the revolution; we have never joked about this. There is a mixed economy because we have our feet on the ground, because we require all Nicaraguans' efforts to rebuild the country, because we have an original blueprint and because that is in keeping with our situation and there can be no mixed economy without its synthesis, which is political pluralism. Nevertheless, it is no longer the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie which determines the rules of the game, and it is rather disconcerted and scared. They have governed Nicaragua and have cheated and exploited this people, and they cannot conceive the possibility that we are honest. If they have always lied, they are liars from the historical viewpoint; they do not believe that we are capable of always telling the truth. As I told the International Human Rights Commission, people who visited us, we all judge others by our own standards; moreover, it is a very primitive bourgeoisie. But we are making an effort to talk with them and to explain to them that we are talking absolutely seriously about a mixed economy and political pluralism. And we believe, regardless of the fact that some of them will never succeed in realizing that there has been a revolution here, that things have really changed; many of those employers will stay here in Nicaragua and contribute to output, and those who do not understand, who disinvest enterprises and who conspire against the revolution, will have no alternative but to go permanently to the place where they usually spend their vacations....

[Question] Your insurrection was a real political and military triumph. The literacy campaign was also a great cultural triumph. But there are grave problems in your economy. Part of this is that many people are unemployed, and you have expropriated a good deal of Somoza's land. For instance, in Masachaca you expropriated a sugar plantation where there is insufficient manpower and they have to work even on weekends.... When a private producer does not accept the responsibility for planting all his land, the government accepts that responsibility. If there is an army for defense, could there be one for output?

[Answer] The economic problem is a grave problem. In 1979 there was an unemployment rate of about 40 percent in Nicaragua, in 1980, 17 percent were unemployed, and in 1981 it is planned that this will fall to 12 percent. For 1980, 90,000 jobs were planned. The economic recovery plan exceeded this target, creating 107,000 jobs. I even believe that this is one of the Latin American countries with the lowest unemployment rates. We estimate that unemployment will disappear completely in Nicaragua within a very brief historical period, not exceeding 3 years. I must also point out that the inflation rate was one of the lowest in Latin America--about 16 percent. This can only mean that the revolutionary government has acted very responsibly, has been very mindful of our real means. But this does not mean that Nicaragua's economic problem is resolved, or anything like it. I believe that this country's problem is the problem of energy. We spend 60 percent of GNP on energy, on oil and on paying off the foreign debt. Next year, if we continue at the same rate, we would have to use 80 percent of our exportable resources to pay off the foreign debt and purchase oil, and unless we adopt solid measures, our output will soon be insufficient to pay for the oil and pay off the foreign debt. And the oil is consuming prosperity. We are having to export our living standard in return for oil in such a way that it is possible to say "energy or death." Either we seek to construct hydroelectric power plants and at the same time develop geothermal energy, or else we take off all the clothes we Nicaraguans have and use them as fuel. Or else we virtually disappear.

There is a chance that we have oil, and Venezuela has already offered to help us in the search for oil, taking the first steps. Perhaps Libya will also help us, and probably Mexico. We must resolve the problem of the construction of a hydroelectric power plant called Copalar, which requires an investment of $600 million. We must find somebody to help us finance it. But fortunately revolutions are very creative and we will do something.

Foodstuffs, Oil of the Future

Once the energy problem has been resolved, it can be stated that we can make steady strides in economic development. In this connection our strategy is aimed at developing agricultural output, modernizing agriculture and developing a complementary industry also devoted to developing agriculture, because even though we currently have the tragedy of oil, I believe that commonsense itself tells people that the problem of the future, with the accelerated growth of population in the world, will be the problem of foodstuffs. And perhaps the problem of the year 2000 will be the problem of foodstuffs, and we want to become good producers of foodstuffs for export. In the meantime, is it not understandable that there are economic difficulties in our country? Is not that situation understandable when we received a ruined country? A country with a debt of about $600 million, a country looted by foreign intervention and by the treasonous and unpatriotic governments which have dominated the political scene in Nicaragua throughout its history. Revolutions cannot resolve a country's economic situation by decree. Revolutions cannot resolve anything by decrees. Even our recently acquired dignity was not decreed but something which we gained in the course of a difficult and very bloody struggle.

[Question] Do the country's government and political leaders intend to adopt any measure of a judicial or exceptional nature, including with respect to the domestic conspiracies which are directly connected with the economic aggression from outside, with the military harassment and, of course, with the campaign to besiege the revolutionary process? Do you have measures prepared, and of what kind, for the eventuality of private enterprise and domestic reaction endangering the Nicaraguan revolution?

[Answer] If they corner us, if they put us against the wall, if the revolution is in danger, we--let this not be forgotten--hold power, and I say that we hold power because I would like to point out that one Latin American blueprint could not be carried through because the revolutionaries in that country--the fraternal republic of Chile--did not hold power. That is why we can negotiate in the economic field and we can negotiate on some aspects in the political field. What is not on the negotiating table is power. And do you know what power means, in addition to the people's support, which we have? (He called one of the soldiers on guard in front of one of the entrances to the room where the interview was taking place, and on seeing he had his handgun but not his rifle, he rapped out at him: "What have you done with your rifle?" "It's there," the member of his bodyguard said, pointing outside the room. "That is power. Never abandon it by any means...," he added sarcastically--MUNDO OBRERO note) But, of course, guns are useless if there is no support from the people, if it is not the people who hold the guns in their hands. That combination of the people and guns is what makes a revolution's power. And we are afraid that that conception of a mixed economy and political pluralism could be difficult to sustain at some point, although, I repeat, that does not depend on us. What we will not endanger is the people's victory.

Revolution is Irreversible

[Question] Almost 2 years after victory, what is your assessment of the revolution? And a second question: What are the crucial aims in the field of international cooperation for Nicaragua?

[Answer] The revolution is irreversible and this is a short answer to your first question. As for the second question, everybody now knows the history of U.S. relations with our country. At some time they must surely have heard of the "big stick" policy. Years have gone by, but I believe that things have basically not changed: The big stick is now covered with dollars and they are trying to influence and hinder this revolution through economic pressures. This objectively means that we will have economic difficulties. But we revolutionaries like difficult things. When things are too easy we get bored. Our enemies should note that difficulties and danger do not worry us. They are what add spice to life, and peoples become greater when they have difficulties.

[Question] Where have loans been obtained hitherto and how much do you estimate you will need? What is the discrepency between what you need and what you know you will obtain?

[Answer] We need $2 billion. There is a change of some loans from Africa and some substantial aid from the socialist countries. There is even a chance of a U.S. loan. The problem is that they say that they will only grant us a loan if we behave properly. The huge contradiction is that we will continue to misbehave, but are negotiating loans all over the place, and doors have not been closed to us. Of course foreign aid is not the basic factor. This is the people's work, increased productivity. I could not say what discrepancy there will be between what we will need and what we will receive because there are some possibilities still being negotiated. For the time being what we need most pressingly is finance for the Copalar hydroelectric power plant, and we are negotiating this with Brazil, with the socialist countries and with certain other friendly countries.

[Question] Is the attitude of the U.S. negotiators still in Nicaragua identical to the U.S. administration's obstructionist policy?

[Answer] It can be said that there are no U.S. enterprises in Nicaragua. They are involved in Coca-Cola, and I believe that they own 40 percent of the Intercontinental Hotel. Nevertheless, we have talked with some U.S. businessmen, considering the possibilities of investments in Nicaragua within the rules laid down by an investment law at present being drawn up; the state reserves at least a 51-percent share. We have already signed contracts of this kind with some countries, for instance with Libya, which will be making major investments in stockraising and agriculture. We have talked with Venezuelan businessmen, who are interested in the cultivation of sorghum and other agricultural products, as well as in tourism. The Americans owned mines, but we have nationalized them. I will tell you an anecdote: On some occasion the U.S. ambassador invited me to lunch, and by chance it was at the very moment when the mines were being nationalized. When the wine arrived, I raised my glass and said: "Mr Ambassador, I propose a toast because the mines are being nationalized now." Apart from that, Esso still retains the refinery under its control.

People's Strength

[Question] I imagine that the watchwords defense and production for this year are the politico-military synthesis of a particular situation. I would like to know what the key aspect of defense is, just as earlier you referred to energy as the key aspect of production. Also, how well off is the revolution in terms of political and specialized cadres to implement these watchwords in each social and production sector?

[Answer] Cadres are a problem for all revolutions. This country, backward at all levels, has historically suffered a shortage of trained personnel, and even some of them have left and it is likely that more will leave. The revolution has created very special situations reflected among factory workers and trained personnel. Trained personnel have generally received good incomes but the revolution cannot, because of its lack of resources, offer large salaries, and often private enterprise takes them away to work in its factories, while others

are attracted by offers from abroad. This is why we must train our own personnel here, and this requires a lengthy process and continuous appeals for patriotism from Nicaraguan-trained personnel. We also have a shortage of political cadres. This is one of the major limitations, particularly in translating the above-mentioned watchwords into practice.

As for defense, I will tell you that we have a weakness, and that is we have no air force. But we do have a strength, and that is we have a considerable number of antiaircraft weapons. We have another weakness: We have almost no tanks. But we also have another strength, and that is we have a considerable number of antitank weapons. In short, this is consistant with the revolution itself, because we are not an aggressor, as a country. Our defense is just what it says it is: defense. And it is designed to defend national territory. I hope that we will not have to test the effectiveness of our antitank or antiaircraft weapons. But we have a much more effective strength than all this, namely the people's militia forces, the armed people. They are our main strength.

[Question] What degree of security does the revolution provide? In the jails the Somozaists still maintain their anti-Sandinist aggressiveness. In Honduras the guardsmen are still harassing the Sandinist Army from the border. Also, the daily LA PRENSA is unceasing in its attacks on the directions of the political process, while everyone is aware of the U.S. interest in destabilizing the situation.

[Answer] The guardsmen being held are indeed still hostile toward the revolution. Of course, those who are abroad are hostile too. And if the thousands of guardsmen who died could return to life, they would certainly also be hostile toward the revolution. But some of them are imprisoned, others have left Nicaragua and the remainder are dead. I believe, if I am not mistaken, that we are not dead, imprisoned or outside the country. And our army is not only strong from the viewpoint of quality; it also has the people's support. The real danger is not the guardsmen, because they were here and there were 15,000 or them at the time, yet the people, who were virtually weaponless, succeeded in defeating them. Now there are far fewer of them. The danger lies in any provocation which they may make on the border with Honduras, since this could result in an armed confrontation between Honduras and Nicaragua. Bear in mind that Honduran reaction is worried by the Sandinist revolution. And some Honduran military personnel who feel very military, very technical and very able tend to underestimate us, because they can only see the firepower of certain arms--of the air force and of the armored vehicles--and so could easily fall into subjective assessments. Moreover, an aggression against our country could have domestic motives on the part of Honduras itself. When confronted by border attacks, we usually withdraw our troops at least 1 km, because we would be foolish if we gave in to the provocation and caused a military confrontation.

It is clear that the Nicaraguan revolution caused a change in the geopolitics of the Central American region. This has caused U.S. uneasiness. But the world is no longer so wide and so alien. And you have to be really mean not to help a tiny country which has 3 million inhabitants and has been ruined by a war--a country which has regained its sovereignty--and side with the giant.

[Question] What could be the worst effect on Nicaragua of U.S. policy toward El Salvador?

[Answer] The greatest danger in Central America is that the Americans are arming Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. They are trying to alter the balance of forces from a military viewpoint. There is a very complex and difficult situation in El Salvador at the moment. The Salvadorean Government's hopes of smashing the guerrilla movement have remained unrealized, a mere illusion. El Salvador needs a political solution favorable to the Salvadorean people. Despite this, the U.S. Government is trying to militarily defeat the guerrilla movement. This is why it is still sending weapons to the Salvadoran Government. And to protect what they call their strategic interests they are giving weapons to Guatemala and above all Honduras, where most of the military efforts are being made. If only there were U.S. initiatives for economic development, for instance. If only there were an understanding of what is happening in Central America.

CSO: 3010/1512

MAS LEADER COMMENTS ON PURCHASE OF F-16'S

PA070350 Caracas Radio Continente Network in Spanish 2100 GMT 6 Jul 81

[Interview with Jose Vicente Rangel, former presidential candidate of the Movement to Socialism [MAS], by Manuel Marquez; date and place not given--recorded]

[Text] [Question] What is your opinion of the purchase of F-16's by the Venezuelan Government?

[Answer] On this subject, as any other, one must always consult those who know more about the subject. In this specific case, I think we must first consult the Venezuelan armed forces, especially the air force. If the F-16's are necessary for the country's security and defense, then we must buy the planes; if we do not need them, then we should not buy them. Now, just because we are buying these planes does not mean that the country is going to get involved in an arms race. We must differentiate between the arms race and the country's security and defense.

[Question] According to one leftwing sector, Venezuela is going to become involved in U.S. imperialism's arms race if it purchases those planes. What is your opinion?

[Answer] Well, that is something that needs to be determined. I think the subject of security and defense has to be carefully analyzed and those with the technical knowledge consulted, to determine if the purchase of these planes is justified. I do not believe in passing judgment without first consulting the right sources.

CSO: 3010/1514

END

END OF FICHE

DATE FILMED

July 18, 1981